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1. Introduction 
Survival or event history analysis is the umbrella term for the set of statistical tools that are 
used to answer questions related to timing and the occurrence of an event of interest. It has 
traditionally been applied in the field of medical research where duration until death or 
duration until appearance or reappearance of a disease is usually the event of interest, thus the 
name Survival Analysis. Survival analysis has gained prominent application in other 
disciplines like engineering (known as reliability theory), economics (known as duration 
analysis or duration modelling), sociology (known as event history analysis), political 
science etc. The variable of primary interest in survival analysis is the time to some event, 
which in our application is the incorporation of a firm to bankruptcy filing or some other 
financial distress event. A firm is said to be at risk of the event (bankruptcy/financial distress) 
after the initial event (i.e. incorporation) has taken place. Alternatively, the response variable 
can be viewed as the time duration that a firm spent in a healthy state until transition to a 
bankruptcy state takes place. Survival analysis demands special methods primarily due to 
right-censoring, where the time to the occurrence of an event is unknown for some subjects 
because the event of interest has not taken place by the end of the sampling or observation 
period. These statistical models examine the hazard rate, which is defined as the conditional 
probability that an event of interest occurs within a given time interval.  
The growing popularity of hazard models in predicting corporate failure has motivated us to 
undertake this empirical study. Since the seminal work of Shumway (2001), the use of the 
hazard rate modelling technique has become a popular methodology in bankruptcy prediction 
studies (see among others Chava and Jarrow 2004; Campbell et al. 2008; Gupta et al. 2014). 
However, this growing popularity of hazard models in bankruptcy prediction seems to be 
trend or momentum driven rather than on a strong theoretical underpinning. Although the 
superiority of hazard models in predicting binary outcomes is well documented in the 
literature (see among others Beck et al. 1998; Shumway 2001; Allison 2014), however its 
recent use in predicting corporate failure does not appropriately acknowledge fundamental 
concerns associated with survival analysis. This is because the vast majority of the existing 
studies suffer from at least one of the following issues: (i) inappropriate or no explanation 
behind their choice between discrete-time or continuous-time hazard model (e.g. Bharath and 
Shumway 2008) (ii) inappropriate or no specification of baseline hazard rate while using 
discrete-time hazard models (e.g. Nam et al. 2008, Gupta, Gregoriou, et al. 2014) (iii) no test 
of proportional hazards assumption when using continuous-time Extended Cox models with 
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time-independent covariates (e.g. Liang and Park 2010) (iv) no discussion on frailty and 
recurrent events (e.g. Shumway 2001), and (v) no explanation on how they dealt with the 
issue of delayed entry (e.g. Gupta, Wilson, et al. 2014a).  
Thus, we contribute to the literature by presenting a review and analysis of popular hazard 
models in predicting corporate failure, taking into account the fundamental concerns 
discussed above. Since we often find continuous-time hazard models are being developed 
using discrete-time data (e.g. Bauer and Agarwal 2014), we also contribute to the literature 
by documenting empirical comparison of discrete-time and continuous-time hazard models. 
Multivariate hazard prediction models are developed using financial ratios obtained from 
income statement and balance sheet. The criteria for introducing covariates in multivariate 
models vary across scientific disciplines, and with underlying theoretical or atheoretical 
beliefs or assumptions. Traditionally, vast majority of popular bankruptcy prediction studies 
report atheoretical approach toward selection of covariates and developing multivariate 
predication models (see among others Altman 1968, Ohlson 1980, Shumway 2001, Altman 
and Sabato 2007, Campbell et al. 2008, Korol 2013).  The plausible theoretical angle that we 
may reason is the effect of any given  covariate  on  firms’  default likelihood. For instance, we 
may reason that a firm having higher proportion of debt in its capital structure is more likely 
to default than an almost identical firm with lower amount of debt in its capital structure. 
Thus an increasing value of the   financial   ratio   debt/total   assets   enhances   firms’   default  
likelihood and vice-versa. Similar analogy may be deduced for any possible covariate. 
However with the vast number of financial ratios (or non-financial covariates) available, and 
no proper theory in place, scholars often select covariates that are either advocated by popular 
studies or that suit their empirical research. Thus, in line with the discussion in Hosmer Jr et 
al. (2013) on multivariate model building strategy, we propose an atheoretical econometric 
based model   building   strategy   based   on   covariates’   Average Marginal Effects (AME) and 
their inter-temporal discrimination ability. The reason behind this approach is the following. 
A covariate with higher value of AME induced higher change in the default probability and 
thus should get priority in the covariate selection process in comparison to the one with lower 
value of AME. Also, the earlier the warning signals the longer the preparation time period for 
the forthcoming crisis. Therefore, covariate having forecasting ability over longer horizon 
should be preferred over the covariate with the shorter horizon.  
In addition, we also contribute to the fast growing literature on SMEs bankruptcy, by 
providing comparison of SMEs failure prediction models developed using different 
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definitions of default events. In particular, our comparison involves default definitions based 
on: (i) legal consequences (Chapter 7/11 bankruptcy filings), (ii) financial health, as 
discussed in Pindado et al. (2008) and Keasey et al. (2014) and (iii) both legal and financial 
health of an SME. Our legal definition classifies a firm as default when it files for bankruptcy 
under the legal bankruptcy law (Event 1), which is usually Chapter 7/11 in the United States. 
Our second definition follows the financial distress definition provided by Keasey et al. 
(2014) and classifies a firm as financially distressed if it reports earnings less than its 
financial expenses for two consecutive years, has net worth/total debt less than one, and 
experiences negative growth in net worth for the same two consecutive time periods (Event 
2). The definition of SMEs default that we propose combines Event 1 and Event 2, and 
classifies a firm as default when it files for legal bankruptcy besides being financially 
distressed (Event 3). The detailed analogy behind this default definition is discussed in 
section 3. However, a recent study by Lin et al. (2012) on SMEs default prediction follows 
similar line and predicts SMEs default using different definitions of financial distress.  
 Our research differentiates itself from Lin et al (2012) in several respects. First, we present 
our analysis based on a sample of US SMEs, whereas their study employs sample of UK 
SMEs. They use static binary logistic regression to establish their empirical validations, while 
we use superior dynamic hazard models. Finally, they use a flow-based (earnings/interest 
payable) and stock-based (1 – total liabilities/total assets) insolvency indicators to group the 
firms in their sample into four groups of financial health (which corresponds to their four 
different definitions of financial distress), however our distress definitions are more realistic 
and arguably superior (see Tinoco and Wilson (2013) and Keasey et al. (2014) for relevant 
discussion). 
Our test results obtained by employing firm-year observations of the US SMEs provide 
convincing evidence. To establish the empirical validation, we calculate a wide range of 
financial ratios that   gauges   a   firm’s   performance   from   liquidity,   solvency,   profitability,  
leverage, activity, growth and financing dimensions. Then following the suggestion of 
Hosmer Jr et al. (2013) we use appropriate strategy to narrow down our list of covariates, and 
develop multivariate models. First, in line with the theoretical arguments discrete-time 
duration-dependent hazard models that we develop with logit and complementary log-log 
(clog-log) links provide superior model fit than continuous-time Extended Cox models, as 
they have much lower AIC values than Cox models across all default definitions. However, 
all three econometric specifications lead to almost identical within sample and hold-out 
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sample classification performance. Thus one might be tempted to be indifferent in choice of 
hazard specification. However, coefficients of most covariates in all multivariate hazard 
models show the pattern, |logit| > |cloglog| > |Cox|. This implies, absolute value of a 
covariate’s  coefficient  is  highest  when  estimated  using  discrete-hazard logit specification and 
lowest for continuous Cox specification. Thus, for a unit change in the value of a covariate, 
logit estimates lead to highest change in the outcome probability than its alternative 
counterparts. Hence, we suggest the use of discrete-time hazard model with logit link to 
model interval censored or discrete-time data. But, if the event of interest is not duration 
dependent (i.e. some functional form of time or time dummies are not significant in the 
multivariate model) with the hazard rates being invariant or varies mildly across different 
time periods, then getting involved into the complications of hazard models might not be 
rewarding considering the marginal gain one would obtain using such models. While 
developing our multivariate models we find that, in presence of financial covariates about 
90% of time dummies that we use as baseline hazard specification are insignificant with very 
high values of standard errors. Thus we follow Shumway (2001) and use natural logarithm of 
firms annual age (variable AGE) as baseline hazard specification. This specification is 
significant in most of our multivariate hazard models, but such objective can easily be 
achieved by developing regression models using panel logistic regression techniques that use 
some functional form of time to capture any duration dependency. Although Shumway 
(2001) argue that hazard models are superior to competing static models but AGE variable in 
his multivariate models are insignificant, then how can it be used reliably to predict duration 
specific hazard rates, this is why hazard models are primarily used? Unlike areas like 
medicine or health economics, duration specific prediction of hazard rates is not common in 
bankruptcy or financial distress prediction, thus we do not see any real need of hazard models 
if similar objective could be achieved using much simpler panel logistic regression that 
controls for any duration dependencies.  
Second, the default definition that we propose (Event 3) performs best in classifying 
defaulted   firms.   Thus   a   default   definition   based   on   firms’   financial   health   is   superior   to  
default definition based on legal consequences, while a default definition that considers both 
legal   consequence   and   firms’   financial   health is best. These differences in classification 
performance emphasises the fact that all firms that file for legal bankruptcy are not purely 
due to financial difficulties. A significant number of firms do consider this as a planned exit 
strategy (Bates 2005). Furthermore, we also test the efficiency and stability of covariates 
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suggested by the most popular study on US SMEs bankruptcy prediction by Altman and 
Sabato (2007). Based on our test results, we conclude that the covariates suggested by them 
fail to exhibit satisfactory discriminatory power across all default definitions and up to three 
lagged time periods, and there are several other financial ratios which are better performers. 
Their suggestion might be biased due to their sample selection process, while our study 
employs near population data of US SMEs. 
We expect this study to be a useful guide to academic scholars and practitioners interested in 
building hazard models for making binary predictions. The rest of this paper is organized as 
follows: Section 2 discusses common concerns regarding the use of hazard models and how 
they can be rectified; Section 3 discusses various default definitions that we consider in our 
study; Section 4 provides detailed discussion of our dataset, choice of covariates and 
methodology; in Section 5 we report and discuss our empirical findings and finally, Section 6 
conclude our findings.  
2. Common Concerns of Hazard Models  
2.1 Discrete-time vs Continuous-time Hazard Model 
The survival time, which is the duration or time-to-event, is generally measured in quarterly 
or annual units in bankruptcy studies. Furthermore, the time scale used may be discrete or 
continuous. If the time of occurrence of an event is precisely known, continuous-time hazard 
models are employed, otherwise discrete-time hazard model is an appropriate choice when 
the event takes place within a given time interval and the precise time is unknown (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). Thus from a theoretical point of view, discrete-time hazard 
models are an appropriate choice as a firm may file for bankruptcy anytime within a quarter 
or a year. However, in both models the probability of occurrence of an event at time t is being 
modelled. The dependent variable in a continuous-time model is the hazard rate but in a 
discrete-time model it is the odds ratio (if modelling is done using standard logit/probit 
models). However, recent studies do not provide appropriate explanation behind their choice 
between discrete-time (eg. Campbell et al. 2008, Gupta et al. 2014) and continuous-time 
model (eg. Bharath and Shumway 2008, Chen and Hill 2013). Furthermore, the required 
precision of the timing to an event is significantly dependent on the research question and 
data restrictions. Studies also suggest that results obtained from continuous-time and discrete-
time methods are virtually identical in most models (Yamaguchi 1991; Allison 2014). Having 
said that, the performance of a bankruptcy prediction model is evaluated based on some non-
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parametric classification measures like misclassification matrix, area under receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) curve etc. (see Anderson (2007) for further details). Despite 
the theoretical differences between continuous-time and discrete-time models, if they lead to 
identical classification performance then this theoretical difference is of no practical 
relevance. However, if one is interested in the magnitude of coefficients then a careful choice 
needs to be made between continuous and discrete-time hazard models, as we report higher 
magnitude for discrete-time estimations than continuous-time estimations. Thus, we compare 
the classification performance of most widely used discrete-time duration-dependent hazard 
models (see among others Shumway 2001, Nam et al. 2008) with most popular continuous-
time duration-dependent Cox model (see among others Bharath and Shumway 2008, Chen 
and Hill 2013) to find any differences in their classification performance or magnitude of 
coefficients. If there are no differences, then the Cox model shall be a reasonable and 
convenient choice, as it does not require any baseline hazard specification unlike discrete-
time models (see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012).  
2.2 Specification of Baseline Hazard Rate 
The final step before estimation of discrete-time hazard model is the specification of baseline 
hazard function, i.e. the hazard rate when all the covariates are set to zero. The baseline 
hazard can be estimated using time dummies (Beck et al. 1998) or some other functional 
form of time (see Jenkins (2005) for details). However, recent studies seem to distort this idea 
of baseline hazard and have established their own version of baseline hazard that includes 
macroeconomic variables (Nam et al. 2008), insolvency risk (Gupta et al. 2014) etc., in the 
baseline hazard function (it is more appropriate to acknowledge them as control variables). 
While several studies do not report any baseline hazard function in their discrete hazard 
model (see among others Campbell et al. 2008, Bauer and Agarwal 2014). In light of the 
basic theory of survival analysis, this is inappropriate. Thus, we address this misleading 
concern in this study and show the steps that need to be followed in specifying the baseline 
hazard function while developing a discrete hazard model.  
This can be done by defining time-varying covariates that bears functional relationship with 
survival times. Popular specifications are log(survival time), polynomial in survival time, 
fully non-parametric and piece-wise constant (Jenkins 2005). Duration-interval-specific 
dummy variables need to be created for specifying a fully non-parametric baseline hazard. 
The number of dummy variables needs to be equal to one less than the maximum survival 
time in the dataset. For instance, if the maximum survival time is fifty years, then forty nine 
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dummy variables are required for model estimation (e.g. Beck et al. 1998). However, this 
method becomes cumbersome if the maximum survival time in the dataset is very high as in 
case of bankruptcy databases. A reasonably convenient alternative way of specifying the 
baseline hazard function is to use piece-wise constant method. In this, the survival times are 
split into different time intervals that are assumed to exhibit constant hazard rate. However, 
one must note that if there exist time intervals or time dummies with no events then one must 
drop the relevant firm-time observation with no event from the estimation or else duration 
specific hazard rate cannot be estimated for these time intervals/dummies (see Jenkins 2005; 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). Considering the estimation convenience one might be 
tempted to use the piece-wise constant specification of baseline hazard rate. However, if the 
hazard curve shows frequent and continuous steep rises and falls, then fully non-parametric 
baseline hazard might be an appropriate choice. 
2.3 Proportional Hazards Assumption for Cox Model 
Studies which employ continuous-time Cox models are mostly silent on the critical test of 
proportional hazards (PH) assumptions  for time-independent covariates (e.g. Liang and Park 
2010). The PH assumption implies that the hazard rate of any particular subject is a constant 
proportion of the hazard rate of any other subject across time (Mills 2011). The violation of 
this assumption might lead to overestimation (the covariate violates this assumption and 
exhibit an increasing hazard ratio over time) or underestimation (the covariate violates this 
assumption and exhibit a decreasing hazard ratio over time) of hazard risk (Mills 2011). It 
also results in incorrect standard errors and decrease in the power of significance tests (Box-
Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002). The violation of PH assumption is a frequent phenomenon and 
thus, it should always be checked and reported in studies. Having said that, Allison (2010)  
warns that, it is not enough to worry only about the violation of the PH assumption but also 
about other basic requirements, such as incorporation of relevant explanatory variables. 
Although all the covariates that we employ in this study are time-dependent, if one also 
employs time-independent covariates, then one should take cognizance of this serious and 
neglected concern and use appropriate methods to test, report and rectify any violation of the 
proportional hazards assumptions1. 
                                                 
1 See Kleinbaum and Klein (2012) for detailed understanding about various tests of proportional hazards 
assumption for time-independent covariates. A Cox model with time-dependent covariates does not need to 
satisfy the proportional hazards assumption and is called an Extended Cox model. However, if the model 
employs both time-dependent and time-independent covariates, then PH assumption for time-independent 
covariates must be satisfied.  
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2.4 Frailty and Recurrent Events 
Another highly neglected area of concern is frailty and recurrent events. Correlation of event 
time occurs when firms experiencing default event belong to a particular cluster or groups 
like industry, geographic location etc. or in case of recurrent events, where a firm experiences 
a default event more than once in its lifetime. In the United States (US), the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code) governs the legal processes involved in dealing with 
corporate financial distress. It allows firms facing financial distress for a liquidation process 
(Chapter 7) or a reorganization process (Chapter 11)2. Chapter 7 leads to permanent shut 
down of a financially distressed firm, while Chapter 11 aims at rehabilitation of financially 
distressed but economically viable firms. Hotchkiss (1995) examines 197 publicly traded 
firms that filed for Chapter 11 protection during 1979 to 1988 and later recovered from 
Chapter 11 as publicly traded firms. He reports that 40% of the firms continue to experience 
operating losses and 32% either restructure their debt or re-enter bankruptcy in the three years 
following the acceptance of reorganization plans. Thus a firm may witness multiple distress 
events in its lifetime. Given that these issues of clustering and recurrent events are an integral 
part of the real-life environment, they should be made an essential and standard part of 
contemporary event history analysis (see Box-­‐‑Steffensmeier and De Boef (2006) and Mills 
(2011) for advanced discussion). The solution is to introduce a frailty term in the hazard 
models. Frailty is an unobserved random proportionality factor that modifies the hazard 
function to account for random effects, association and unobserved heterogeneity into hazard 
models (Mills 2011). Not including a frailty term implicitly assumes that all firms are 
homogeneous, which implies that all the firms are prone to experience default in the same 
way, with the duration of defaults considered as independent from one another. However, in 
real-life   some   firms   are   more   ‘frail’   and   thus provide a higher likelihood to experience 
default. Therefore, our empirical analysis also accounts for this neglected concern while 
developing hazard models. 
2.5 Delayed Entry  
Furthermore, in time-to-event studies the origin of time scale is an important consideration, 
as at this point in time a firm starts being at risk of experiencing the financial distress event. 
This needs to   be   firms’   incorporation   date   in   bankruptcy   studies. However in cases where 
incorporation  dates  are  unknown,  firms’  age  or   the  earliest  available date of information in 
                                                 
2 Although the law provide other provisions but we consider only Chapter 11 and Chapter 7, as vast majority of 
the financially distressed firms file for either of these two. 
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the databases serves as useful proxy. A   firm’s   incorporation  date  may  differ   from   the   start 
date of sampling period; as a result the time firms become at risk do not coincide with the 
start of the sampling period. This leads to delayed entry, which means that a firm become at 
risk before entering the study. Thus the appropriate likelihood contribution under delayed 
entry is obtained by allowing the firm to start contributing observations from time period 
𝑡௞ + 1 and discarding prior time periods (see section 14.2.6 of Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 
2012). Here 𝑡௞ is the time period for which a firm has already been at risk when it enters the 
research study. 
3. Different Default Definitions for SMEs 
Traditionally, the debate about financial distress has been rooted in the literature pertaining to 
firms’  capital  structure with particular relevance to the cost of financial distress (see Altman 
and Hotchkiss (2006) for an overview). However, current studies also highlight its growing 
importance   in   the  context  of  modelling   firms’   insolvency  hazard   (e.g. Keasey et al. 2014). 
Recent  literature  pertaining  to  firms’  default prediction  argue  that  a  ‘financial  distress’  based  
definition of default contingent upon a firm’s  earnings and market value is more appropriate 
than the definition based on legal consequence (Pindado et al. 2008, Tinoco and Wilson 
2013, Keasey et al. 2014). We see a range of definitions in the empirical literature that have 
been   successfully   used   to   define/proxy   firms’   default/distress   risk.   Most   of   the   empirical  
models employ a definition of default that is in line with some legal consequence (e.g. 
Chapter 11/7 Bankruptcy Code in United States; United Kingdom Insolvency Act), which 
lead to a well-defined and clearly separated population of bankrupt versus non-bankrupt 
firms. This remains the most widely used method of classifying financially distressed firms in 
the   empirical   literature,   that   employ   binary   choice   statistical      models   to   predict   firms’  
financial distress  (see among others Altman 1968, Ohlson 1980, Hillegeist et al. 2004, Gupta 
et al. 2014a). However, legal definition of default may suffer from noteworthy issues. Since 
insolvency involves lengthy legal processes, often there exists a significant time gap between 
real/economic default date and legal default date. UK companies exhibit a significant time 
gap of up to 3 years (average of about 1.17 year) between the time they enter into the state of 
financial distress and legal default dates (Tinoco and Wilson 2013), while companies in US 
stop reporting their financial statements about two years before filing for bankruptcy 
(Theodossiou 1993). Recent changes in insolvency legislation (for instance, the Enterprise 
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Act 2004 in the UK and Chapter 11 in the US) does consider this problem and suggested 
several stages of financial distress based upon the severances of financial distress.  
Further, a financially distressed firm may go for a formal reorganization involving the court 
system or an informal reorganization through the market participants (e.g. Blazy et al. 2013). 
Debt restructuring, asset sale and infusion of new capital from external sources are the three 
commonly used market-based or private methods of resolving financial distress (Senbet and 
Wang 2010). Debt restructuring allows a financially distressed firm to renegotiate the 
outstanding debt obligation or related credit terms with its creditors but is critically subject to 
whether the debt obligation is due to private or public entity. As an alternative to this, a 
distressed firm may sell-off some of its existing assets to reduce its outstanding liability or 
may undertake new profitable investment opportunities, which may eventually help it to 
overcome its misery. Despite having profitable investment opportunities, a financially 
distressed firm might not be able to generate additional funding due to high risk involved in 
financing  distress  firms  and  the  “debt  overhang”  problem  as  discussed  in  Myers (1977). As a 
consequence, infusion of new capital from external sources is rarely observed in the 
resolution of financial distress. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that a financially 
distressed firm may not file for Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 protection and choose a private 
workout method of resolving financial distress. Gilson et al. (1990) and Gilson (1997) report 
that firms avoid legal bankruptcy processes by out of court negotiation with creditors. 
However, under the binary classification based on legal consequences, a financially 
distressed firm which has not filed for Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 is not considered as a 
financially distressed firm. Thus, there is a clear need of a mechanism to identify financially 
distressed firms beyond the legal definitions. In this context, we find the argument of Pindado 
et al. (2008) highly relevant and thus we explore the following definitions of SMEs’ default 
events: 
Event 1 – Any firm which files for bankruptcy under Chapter 7/11 is considered default and 
is said to have experienced Event 1. Vast majority of the empirical literature on SMEs default 
prediction employ this kind of binary classification based on some legal consequences to 
classify a firm as healthy or bankrupt (see among others Altman and Sabato 2007, Gupta, et 
al. 2014b). 
Event 2 –  Here we follow the financial distress definition provided by Keasey et al. (2014) 
while classifying a SME as default under Event 2. In particular, we consider a firm as 
P A G E  | 11                                                                                                                              
 
financially distressed (have experienced Event 2) if it’s EBITDA (earnings before interest tax 
depreciation and amortization) is less than its financial expenses for two consecutive years; 
the net worth/total debt is less than one and the net worth experienced negative growth 
between the two periods. Additionally, a firm is also recorded as financially distressed in the 
year immediately following these distress events. 
Event 3 – The third default definition that we propose considers both legal and finance-based 
definition of distress while classify a firm as default. A firm is classified as default under 
Event 3 if it satisfies conditions of Event 1 and Event 2 simultaneously. That is, besides being 
financially distressed it should also file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7/11. Thus a firm is 
said to experience Event 3 in a given year if it experiences Event 1 in that same year and 
Event 2 the year earlier.  The rationale being, all business closures are not due to financial 
difficulties, many file for legal bankruptcies as part of their planned exit strategies (see 
among others Bates 2005). Thus, this definition identifies firms which follow legal exit routes 
due to pure financial difficulties. 
4. Empirical Methods 
This section provides discussion related to the source and use of dataset, selection of 
explanatory variables and statistical models that we use in our study. 
4.1 Dataset 
To predict default events over the next one year horizon, our empirical analysis employs 
annual firm-level accounting data from the Compustat database. We consider a relatively 
long analysis period that includes all SMEs that entered the Compustat database after January 
1950 but before April 2015. In line with the widely popular definition of SMEs provided by 
the European Union3 we consider a firm as SME if it has less than 250 employees. In 
                                                 
3 We are aware of the fact that the US Small Business Administration (SBA) defines a SME differently. Broadly 
it considers a firm as SME if it has less than 500 employees and annual turnover of less than $7.5 million. But, 
their precise definition varies across industrial sectors to reflect industry differences. For instance, a mining firm 
with less than 1000 employees, a general building and heavy construction firm with annual turnover of less than 
$36.5 million and a manufacturing firm with less than 1500 employees are classified as small businesses as per 
SBA (https://www.sba.gov/contracting/getting-started-contractor/make-sure-you-meet-sba-size-
standards/summary-size-standards-industry-sector; accessed on May 18, 2016 ). This may not be a convenient 
workable  definition  from  lenders’  point  of  view.  Beside  many  of  these  firms are too big to be called SMEs in the 
real sense despite being classified as small firms as per SBA. They do this primarily to determine the eligibility 
of  a  firm  for  SBA’s  financial  assistance  or  to  its  other  programs.  Thus  we  follow  more  appropriate  and popular 
definition of SMEs provide by the European Union for this study. Besides, the most popular study on predicting 
bankruptcy of US SMEs by Altman and Sabato (2007) also  follow  the  European  Union’s  definition  of  SMEs.  
They consider a firm as SMEs if it  reports  sales  revenue  of  less  than  $65  million  which  is  approximately  €50  
million suggested by the European Union. 
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Compustat, a company  has  “TL”  footnote  on  status  alert  (data  item  STALT)  indicating  that  
the company is in bankruptcy or liquidation (i.e. Chapter 7/11). Generally, a company will 
have a "TL" footnote on status alert - quarterly (and annual)   for   the   ﬁrst   and   following  
quarters (and years) the company is in Chapter 11. An "AG" footnote will appear on Total 
Assets (AT_FN) – quarterly, on the quarter the company emerges from Chapter 11. Thus, 
within its lifetime a firm may go for multiple bankruptcy filings in form of Chapter 11 and 
may remain in the bankruptcy state until it emerges. Consequently, taking the bankruptcy 
filing date as the bankruptcy indicator ignores the possible subsequent bankruptcy states. 
Thus, our first definition (Event 1) consider a firm under bankruptcy when its status alert is 
“TL”  and  healthy  otherwise. This, classification is consistent with the basic notion of survival 
analysis in which a subject may remain in a given risky state for more than one time period 
and thus experience an event of interest for more than one time period.  
Table 1 reports age-wise distribution of censored and distressed firms under respective 
default events (see section 3 for definitions of various default events). We proxy a firm’s age 
as the earliest year for which, financial information for that firm is available in the Compustat 
database. In Compustat, 1950 is the earliest point in time for which financial information is 
available. Thus, in order to get the complete financial history of a firm we selected only those 
firms which entered the Compustat database after 1950. Further, firms belonging to 
Transportation, Communications & Public Utilities; Finance; Insurance & Real Estate; and 
Public Administration industrial sectors have been excluded from our empirical analysis (see 
Table 2 for details). This is to ensure homogeneity within our sample, as financial firms have 
different asset-liability structure and rest are heavily regulated by governments. It should be 
noted that same firms might have multiple entry and exits in our database. For instance, when 
an existing SME reports number of employees over 250, it exits our sample and returns only 
when its number of employees falls below 250. We  also  exclude  subsidiary  firms  (if  ‘stock  
ownership   code’   (Compustat   data   item   ‘stko’)   is   ‘1’   (subsidiary   of   a   publicly   traded  
company)   or   ‘2’   (subsidiary of a company that is not publicly traded) in the Compustat 
database). 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
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4.2 Selection of Variables 
Dependent Variable: Considering the discussion presented in section 3, in this study we 
consider Event 1, Event 2 and Event 3 as dependent variables for the estimation of respective 
hazard models. 
Independent Variables: To develop multivariate hazard models we employ wide range of 
financial ratios that have established  reputation  in  predicting  firms’ default risk. Our choice 
of covariates reflects firms’   performance   from leverage, liquidity, solvency, activity, 
profitability and interest coverage dimensions. Specifically, we incorporate covariates from 
popular studies4 on SMEs bankruptcy like Altman and Sabato (2007), Lin et al. (2012), 
Gupta et al.( 2014) and a recent book on credit risk management by Joseph (2013).  Table 3 
lists all the covariates along with their respective definition. To eliminate the influence of 
outliers on our statistical estimates, we restrict the range of all our financial ratios between 
5th and 95th percentiles. 
Control Variables: Considering the suggestion of Gupta, Gregoriou, et al. (2014) we control 
for the diversity between micro, small and medium firms by employing dummy variables for 
micro (firms with less than 10 employees) and small (firms having greater than 9 but less 
than 50 employees) firms into our multivariate models. To control the volatility in the 
macroeconomic environment affecting specific industrial sector, we calculate an additional 
measure of industry risk (RISK) as the failure rate (number of firms experiencing the event of 
interest in respective industrial sector in a given year/total number of firms in that industrial 
sector in that year) in each of the seven industrial sectors in a given year. Higher values 
indicate higher risk of default and vice versa.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
4.3 Hazard Model 
4.3.1 Basic Hazard Model 
Survival analysis deals with the analysis of the time to the occurrence of an event, which in 
this study is the time until a financial default event. Suppose T is a non-negative random 
variable which denotes the time to a distress event and t represent any specific value of 
interest for the random variable T. If instead of referring to T’s probability density function as 
                                                 
4 To get detailed understanding pertaining to our choice of covariates and their relationship with the default 
probability, we strongly recommend one to go through these references. 
P A G E  | 14                                                                                                                              
 
𝑓(𝑡) or its cumulative distribution function (CDF) as 𝐹(𝑡) = Pr  (𝑇 ≤ 𝑡), we think of T’s 
survivor function, 𝑆(𝑡) or its hazard function ℎ(𝑡) the understanding of survival analysis 
becomes much more convenient (Cleves et al. 2010). The survivor function expresses the 
probability of survival beyond some time t, which is simply the reverse CDF of T, i.e.: 
𝑆(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑡) = Pr(𝑇 > 𝑡)                                                                                                        (1) 
At 𝑡 = 0 the survivor function is equal to one and moves toward zero as 𝑡 approaches 
infinity. The relationship between survivor function and hazard function (also known as the 
conditional failure rate at a particular time  𝑡) is mathematically defined as follows: 
ℎ(𝑡) = lim
∆௧→଴
Pr  (𝑡 + ∆𝑡 > 𝑇 > 𝑡|𝑇 > 𝑡)
∆𝑡
=
𝑓(𝑡)
𝑆(𝑡)
=
−𝑑  ln𝑆(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
;                                                (2) 
In simple words, hazard rate is the (limiting) probability that the failure event occurs within a 
given time interval, given that the subject have survived to the start of that time interval, 
divided by width of the time interval. The hazard rate varies from zero to infinity and may be 
increasing, decreasing or constant over time. Hazard rate of zero signifies no risk of failure at 
that instant, while infinity signifies certainty of failure at that instant.   
4.3.2 Extended Cox  Model 
An elegant and computationally feasible way to estimate the hazard function (2) is to use the 
semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards (CPH) model (Cox 1972, 1975) as shown in the 
following equation:  
ℎ௜(𝑡) = ℎ଴(𝑡). exp(𝑥௜
ᇱ𝛽)                                                                                                                          (3) 
Here, 𝑥௜ᇱ is the transpose of covariates vector x௜, β is the vector of regression parameters and 
ℎ଴(𝑡) is the arbitrary unspecified baseline hazard function (hazard risk that the subject i faces 
in absence of covariates; i.e. 𝑥 = 0). The regression parameters (βs) are estimated using 
partial likelihood function which takes into account censored survival times and eliminates 
the unspecified baseline hazard term ℎ଴(𝑡). CPH model treats time as continuous, and is 
semi-parametric in the sense that the model does not make any assumption related to the 
shape5 of the hazard function over time. 
 
                                                 
5 It could be increasing, decreasing, decreasing and then increasing or any shape we may imagine. But it 
assumes  that  whatever  is  the  general  shape  of  the  hazard  function,  it’s  same  for  all  the  subjects. 
P A G E  | 15                                                                                                                              
 
Some  of  the  factors  (leverage  ratio,  profitability  ratio,  volatility  etc.)  affecting  firms’  survival  
vary with time but the fixed CPH model as highlighted in equation (3) does not allow for 
time-varying covariates. However, inclusion of time-varying covariates in CPH framework is 
relatively easy and thus enables us to predict dynamic survival probability over the life of the 
firm. The CPH model can be generalized to allow for the covariate vector 𝑥 to be time-
varying as follows: 
ℎ௜(𝑡) = ℎ଴(𝑡). exp(𝑥(𝑡)௜
ᇱ𝛽)                                                                                                            (4) 
Where 𝑥(𝑡) is the covariate vector at time 𝑡. The rate of change of time-varying covariates is 
different for different subjects and hence the estimated hazard ratio does not remain constant 
over time. However, the inclusion of time-varying covariates is not problematic for the partial 
likelihood estimation (Allison 2010) and hence CPH model can be easily improved to allow 
for non-proportional hazard risks. It implies that a general hazard model which does not have 
the restrictive assumption of constant proportional hazard ratio can be generalized by 
inclusion of both duration-dependent and duration-independent covariates in the same model. 
However, a CPH model with time-varying covariates is no longer a proportional hazards 
model and a CPH model with time-varying covariates is appropriately called Extended Cox 
model (see Kleinbaum and Klein 2012). Additionally the time-varying covariates do not need 
to satisfy the proportional hazards assumption. However, if the model also includes time-
independent covariates, then appropriate test of proportionality is suggested (see Kleinbaum 
and Klein 2012).  One major advantage of Cox method is that it easily addresses the problem 
of right censoring but it suffers from a major disadvantage of proportional hazards 
assumption if time-independent covariates are also included in the model. One may consider 
to test this restrictive proportional hazard assumption that is being neglected in most 
empirical studies by using the scaled Schoenfeld residual (Grambsch and Therneau 1994)  
rather than the Schoenfeld residual (Schoenfeld 1982). While estimating our empirical model 
we also control for unobserved heterogeneity and recurrent events by including a shared 
frailty term into our model via a multiplicative scaling factor 𝛼௜ (see Cleves et al. 2010). 
These signifies group-level frailty and are unobservable positive values assumed to follow the 
Gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance θ to be estimated using the development 
sample (see Jenkins 2005). Also, the time at which the distress event occurs is not really 
relevant for hazard risk analysis using Cox method, but the ordering of the distress event is 
critically important. In situations where multiple firms experience the event of interest at the 
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same time, exact ordering of distress event is difficult. Thus we use Efron6 (1977)’s  method  
to handle cases of tied failure times.  
Recent empirical literature highlight the use of CPH in default prediction studies (see among 
others Bharath and Shumway 2008; Chen and Hill 2013) but it is inappropriate to use CPH 
model in discrete-time framework for the reasons we discussed earlier and in the following 
section. Both, Bharath and Shumway (2008) and Chen and Hill (2013) are silent on issues 
pertaining to shared frailty and tied failure times, which we consider are important aspects 
and should be addressed in empirical studies if one choose to use CPH modelling technique. 
4.3.3 Discrete Hazard Model 
When an event may be experienced at any instant in continuous-time (exact censoring and 
survival times are recorded in relatively fine time scales such as seconds, hours or days) and 
there are no tied survival time periods, then continuous-time survival model is an appropriate 
choice (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). However, if the data has relatively few censoring 
or survival times with tied survival time periods, then discrete-time survival model is more 
appropriate where coarse times-scales are generally used, for instance, expressing time to an 
event in weeks, months or years (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). Interval-censoring7 
leads to discrete-time data, which is the case with our database. Here, the beginning and end 
of each time interval is same for all the SMEs in analysis time, as the information is recorded 
on annual basis. Thus, the event of interest may take place at any time within the year but it 
cannot be known until the information is provided at the end of the year. Hence, considering 
the discussion above we also estimate our hazard models in discrete-time framework with 
random effects (𝛼௜), thus controlling for unobserved heterogeneity or shared frailty. 
The discrete-time representation of the continuous-time proportional hazard model with time-
varying covariates leads to a generalized linear model with complementary log-log (Grilli 
2005; Jenkins 2005; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012) link, specified as follows: 
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑔൫ℎ௜(𝑡)൯ ≡ ln{− ln(1 − ℎ௜(𝑡))} = 𝛽𝑥(𝑡)௜
ᇱ + 𝜆௧                                                              (5)     
Here, 𝜆௧ is time-specific constant which is estimated freely for each time period t, thus 
making no assumption about the baseline hazard function within the specified time interval. 
                                                 
6 In our analysis the risk set keeps on decreasing with successive failures, Efron (1977)’s  method  reduces the 
weight of contributions to the risk set from the subjects which exhibit tied event times in successive risk sets.  
7 The event is experienced in continuous-time but we only record the time interval within which the event takes 
place. 
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However, in most empirical studies logit link is used over complementary log-log (clog-log) 
link as specified in equation 6. 
𝑃௜,௧(𝑌 = 1) =
𝑒ఈ(௧)ା  ௫(௧)೔
ᇲఉ
1 + 𝑒ఈ(௧)ା  ௫(௧)೔
ᇲఉ
                                                                                                      (6) 
Where α(t) captures baseline hazard rate and  𝑃௜,௧(𝑌 = 1) is the probability of experiencing 
the event of interest by subject i at time t. This will produce very similar results as long as the 
time intervals are small (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012) and sample bad rate (% of failed 
to non-failed) is very low (Jenkins 2005). One may also choose probit link function, if one 
strongly believes that the underlying distribution of the process being modelled is normal, or 
if the event under study is not a binary outcome but a proportion (e.g. proportion of 
population at different income levels). While these specifications will generally yield results 
that are quite similar but there are significant differences in terms of non-proportionality (see 
Sueyoshi (1995) for detiled discussion). Thus, we estimate our discrete hazard models with 
clog-log and logit links and analyse any differences in the magnitude of coefficients and 
classification performance of multivariate models developed. 
4.4 Performance Evaluation 
To gauge the classification performance of the models developed in identifying distressed 
firms, we estimate area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve (AUROC). 
This curve originates from the signal detection theory, which shows how the receiver detects 
existence of signal in presence of noise. It is obtained by plotting the probability of detecting 
true-positive (sensitivity) (a firm actually defaults and the model classifies it as expected 
default) and false-negative (1 – specificity) (a firm actually defaults but the model classifies it 
as expected non-default) for an entire range of possible cutpoints (these are probability 
values). Cutpoints, c, is defined to obtain derived binary variable by comparing each 
estimated probability with c. If the estimated probability is greater than c then we let the 
value of the derived binary variable be equal to 1 or 0 otherwise. AUROC is now considered 
to be the most popular non-parametric method for evaluating a fitted prediction model’s  
ability to assign, in general, higher probabilities of the event of interest to the subgroup which 
develops the event of interest (dependent variable = 1) than it does to the subgroup which do 
not develop the event of interest (dependent variable = 0). The AUROC provides a measure 
of the prediction model’s   ability   to discriminate between those firms which experience the 
event of interest versus those who do not. Its value ranges from 0.5 to 1.0, which encapsulates 
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the classification performance of the model developed. AUROC of 1 denotes a model with 
perfect prediction accuracy and 0.5 suggest no discrimination ability. In general there is no 
‘golden   rule’   regarding   the   value   of   AUROC,   however   anything between 0.7 and 0.8 is 
acceptable, while above 0.8 is considered to be excellent (Hosmer Jr et al. 2013). 
5. Results and Discussion 
We begin this section with analysis of key measures of descriptive statistics of our covariates 
along with relevant discussion pertaining to correlation among them. We perform univariate 
regression analysis of each covariate in turn using respective event definition, and respective 
econometric specification, to understanding any unexpected behaviour in their discriminatory 
performance. Then we discuss development and performance evaluation of multivariate 
discrete-time hazard models developed using logit and clog-log links. Finally, we develop 
multivariate extended Cox models and provide a comparative discussion on the performance 
of multivariate models developed using different default definitions. Additionally, to gauge 
any temporal variation in the explanatory power of our covariates, we perform our regression 
analysis using covariate that are lagged by T – 1, T – 2 and T – 3 time periods. 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
Inspection of descriptive statistics gives us an initial understanding about the variability of 
covariates and the potential biasness that may arise in the multivariate setup due to any 
unexpected extreme variability. We expect the mean of covariates that exhibit positive 
relationship with the insolvency/distress hazard to be higher for distressed group (status 
indicator = 1) than their healthy or censored counterparts (e.g. STDEBV in Table 4). On the 
contrary, the mean of covariates that shows negative relationship with the insolvency hazard 
is expected to be lower for distressed group than their healthy counterparts (e.g. CTA in 
Table 4). A closer look at Table 4 reveals that the mean, median and standard deviation of 
most of the covariates under respective event definitions are as per our expectation without 
any extreme variability. However, EBITDAIE and STDEBV raise some serious concerns. 
The mean of EBITDAIE is very high, as most of the firms in our sample do not incur or incur 
very little interest expenses. This leads to very high difference between its mean and median 
values, resulting in a highly skewed distribution and very high value of standard deviation. 
Although STDEBV and TLNW are positively  related   to   firms’  default  probability  but   their 
mean of the default group is significantly lower than censored group under Event 3, which is 
quite surprising as we expect otherwise. We also observe that, the mean of respective 
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covariates across different default definitions in Table 4 reveal very little variation in their 
values. This signal little variation in the classification performance of multivariate models 
developed, and this is confirmed by our results in section 5.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
The correlation matrix in Table 5 shows that some of the covariates exhibit moderate to 
strong correlation with other covariates. RETA shows strong positive correlation of 
approximately 0.65 with EBITDATA, supporting the belief that SMEs primarily rely on 
internal sources for their funding requirements, thus they end up retaining significant portion 
of their income. Thus issues associated with multicollinearity need to be addressed carefully 
while developing multivariate models. Section 5.3.2 on model building strategy discusses 
how we address this issue in this study.  
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
5.2 Univariate Regression and Average Marginal Effects 
It is always advisable to do some univariate analysis before proceeding to estimation of 
multivariate models. In survival analysis the standard approach is to initially look at Kaplan-
Meier survival curves of all categorical covariates to get an insight about their shape of 
survival functions and proportionality of each group8. Popular non-parametric tests of 
equality of survival functions like log-rank test and the Wilcoxon–Breslow–Gehan test (see 
Cleves et al. 2010) are also reported. However, it is not feasible to calculate Kaplan-Meier 
curves or conduct these non-parametric tests for continuous predictors as continuous 
predictors have too many different levels9. But, Nam et al. (2008) report log-rank test and the 
Wilcoxon–Breslow–Gehan test for their continuous predictor, which, to the best of our 
knowledge is inappropriate and misleading. Considering this constraint, we perform 
univariate regression of each covariate in turn to have an initial insight about their effects on 
respective default events.  
In order to narrow down our list of covariates at first we obtain univariate regression 
estimates using Event 2 as dependent variable and Equation (6) as regression methodology 
(discrete-time hazard model with logit link). Here we use financial distress based definition 
rather than legal bankruptcy with the presumption that it is the primary reason behind 
                                                 
8 See Cleves et al. (2010) for a detailed description of Kaplan-Meier curves. 
9 See for example http://www.ats.ucla.edu/STAT/stata/seminars/stata_survival/default.htm (accessed May 18, 
2016). Also see Cleves et al. (2010) for a more thorough understanding. 
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bankruptcy and always precedes the bankruptcy filing event. Further, filing for legal 
bankruptcy is the least efficient exit strategy for SMEs (Balcaen et al. 2012). Additionally, to 
gauge the temporal variation in the explanatory power of covariates we obtain regression 
estimates for T – 1, T – 2 and T – 3 lagged time periods (see Table 6). At this stage we 
exclude covariates from further empirical analysis that (i) are not significant in all three time 
periods (this  ensures  that  the  selected  covariates  are  consistent  predictors  of  firms’  financial  
health over a sufficiently long time interval to allow for developing a reasonable early 
warning system), or, (ii) are significant but exhibit Average Marginal Effects10 (AME) of less 
than 5% in all three time periods. The rational being, a unit change in the value of significant 
covariates must induce sufficient change in the magnitude of the outcome probability to 
clearly distinguish between distressed and healthy firms.  An interesting thing to observe in 
Table 6  is the AME of Altman and Sabato's (2007) covariates that are widely employed in 
modelling default risk of SMEs. Out of the five covariates that they suggest, three of them 
(STDEBV, EBITDAIE and RETA) exhibit AME of less than 5% with AME of EBITDAIE 
being almost zero. The other two covariates CTA and EBITDATA have AME values less 
than 17%. This suggests that, although these covariates are significant predictors but a unit 
change in their value does not transmit significant change in the probability of outcome 
variable. Although three of Altman and Sabato's (2007) covariates has AME less than 5%, 
but we include them for further empirical analysis to have further understanding about their 
explanatory power in the multivariate setup. Furthermore, the AME of FETA and TTA are 
highest among all covariates suggesting that financial expense and tax are dominant signals 
to identify financially distressed firms. From 27 variables, this helps us to narrow down to 16 
variables that we use for further empirical analysis. Table 7 reports the final list of covariates 
that we use for further univariate and multivariate regression analysis. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
                                                 
10 In non-linear regression analysis, Marginal Effects is an useful way to examine the effect of changes in a 
given covariate on changes in the outcome variable, holding other covariates constant. These can be computed 
as marginal change (it is the partial derivative for continuous predictors) when a covariate changes by an 
infinitely small quantity and discrete change (for factor variables) when a covariate changes by a fixed quantity. 
Whereas, Average Marginal Effects (AME) of a given covariate is the average of its marginal effects computed 
for each observation at its observed values. Alternatively, AME can be interpreted as the change in the outcome 
(financial distress = 1; in our case) probabilities due to unit change in the given covariate, provided other 
covariates are held constant. See Long and Freese (2014) for detailed discussion on this topic.  
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Univariate Regression of Event 1: Section A of Table 8 reports the univariate regression 
estimates for Event 1 using discrete and continuous-time hazard models. Magnitude of 
coefficients of respective covariates (β   in Table 8) obtained using discrete-time hazard 
specification with logit and cloglog links, and extended Cox model are close to each other 
with some variation for covariates TLTA, FETA, CAG, SAG, TTA and RETA. For most of 
the covariates for respective time lags, absolute value of the magnitude of their respective 
coefficients is highest for logit estimates followed by cloglog estimates and least for Cox 
estimates (|logit| > |cloglog| > |Cox|). However, logit and cloglog estimates exhibit almost 
identical model fit as their AIC values are almost identical, but it’s about three times higher 
for Cox estimates. This suggests that discrete-time model with logit/cloglog links offer better 
model fit than extended Cox model. We also see that CAG and SAG are significant in all 
time periods when estimated using discrete hazard model, but becomes insignificant (in T – 2 
and T – 3) when estimated using Cox model. Further, the statistical significance of TLTA, 
NIS and RETA also varies with their econometric specification. Altman and Sabato's (2007) 
covariate EBITDATA loses its statistical significance beyond T – 1; STDEBV shows 
unstable explanatory power (sign is opposite to expectation for T – 1 logit and cloglog 
estimates), its insignificant in T – 1 but significant in T – 2 and T – 3; EBITDAIE is 
significant but its coefficients are almost 0; RETA is significant in T – 1 but is insignificant in 
T – 2 and T – 3 when estimated using discrete-hazard specification. Only CTA shows 
consistent and reliable explanatory power in all three time periods across all econometric 
specifications. Event 1 is the same event definition that they use in their default prediction 
study; however our results do not approve the covariates suggested by them. Their suggestion 
might be biased due to their sample selection process, while we use near-population data to 
establish our empirical validation.  
Univariate Regression of Event 2: Section B of Table 8 reports univariate regression 
estimates obtained using Event 2 as dependent variable. All covariates are significant across 
all econometric specifications for all lagged time periods. We also see that coefficients of 
covariates obtained using logit, cloglog and Cox hazard specification reasonably vary from 
each other, however most covariates follows the pattern |logit| > |cloglog| > |Cox| for 
respective lagged time periods. However, the AIC values of logit and cloglog estimates are 
about three to six times lower than values obtained using Cox specification. This asserts that 
discrete hazard models offers better model fit than its continuous counterpart. Additionally, in 
T – 3, FETA and WCTA fail to remain significant when estimated using Cox specification. In 
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this case, all of  Altman and Sabato's (2007) covariates are significant with expected sign 
across all econometric specification for respective lagged time periods except RETA, for Cox 
estimate at T – 3. All of their covariates also has reasonable magnitude of respective 
coefficients except EBITDAIE, which is again almost 0. However, the real litmus test of their 
covariates will be performed in the multivariate section. 
Univariate Regression of Event 3: Section C of Table 8 reports univariate regression 
estimates obtained using Event 3 as dependent variable. Unlike Event 2 estimates, many of 
the covariates (OPCE, NIS, CAG, STDEBV, EBITDAIE and RETA) show varying 
(insignificant) explanatory power across different time periods. However, here also we see 
the AIC values of discrete-time estimates are much lower than Cox estimates and the pattern 
|logit| > |cloglog| > |Cox| also holds good for most of the covariates. Two of Altman and 
Sabato's (2007) covariates (STDEBV and EBITDAIE) also fail miserably in discriminating 
distressed and censored firms across T – 1 and T – 2 lagged time periods.  
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
5.3 Developing Multivariate Hazard Models 
In this section, we develop and discuss multivariate hazard models for respective default 
definitions discussed in section 2. We begin with our choice for specification of the baseline 
hazard rate, which is required for developing discrete-time duration-dependent hazard 
models, followed by development and discussion of multivariate discrete-time and 
continuous-time hazard models.  
5.3.1 Detection of Baseline Hazard Rate 
Before developing multivariate discrete-time hazard models it is important to choose a 
baseline specification for the hazard rate. Figure 1 shows the table of hazard curves11 
estimated using Kaplan-Meier12 estimator for different default events. The hazard curves of 
all   three   events   exhibit   fairly   different   functional   relationship  with   firms’   age.   The   hazard  
                                                 
11 Table 1 show that the earliest age that a firm experiences distress event under all three default definitions is 
one years. However, the hazard curves start from somewhere around five years. This difference is due to the fact 
that  “sts  graph”  command  in  Stata  performs  an  adjustment  of  the  smoothed  hazard near the boundaries. In case 
of the default kernel function of -sts graph- (Epanechnikov kernel), the plotting range of the smoothed hazard 
function is restricted to be within one bandwidth of each endpoint. The same is true for other kernels, except the 
epan2, biweight, and rectangular kernels, in which case the adjustment is performed using boundary kernels.  If 
we wish to plot an estimate of the hazard for the entire range, we could use a kernel without a boundary 
correction. Alternative, we can use then -noboundary- option, but this will produce an estimate that is biased 
near  the  edges.  See  “help  sts  graph”  in  Stata  and  Silverman (1986) for further details. This will not affect the 
empirical analysis if one uses fully non-parametric method of baseline hazard specification. However, one needs 
to be little careful while using piecewise-constant specification. 
12 See among others Cleves et al. (2010) and Mills (2011) for details regarding Kaplan-Meier estimator. 
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curves of all three events   show   increasing  and  decreasing   relationship  with   firms’  age,   and  
the shape of hazard curves of Event 1 and Event 3 are quite similar. From the surface it might 
look that the default events are highly duration-dependent. However, one might turn sceptical 
after having a looks at the magnitude of hazard rates on the vertical axis. For Event 1 it 
ranges approximately between 0.006 and 0.013; Event 2 between 0.05 and 0.13; and, Event 3 
between 0.00175 and 0.00325. Considering these tight intervals of hazard rates, piece-wise 
specification of baseline hazard might fail to reflect the differences in the hazard rates 
between respective age groups.  Additionally, all three hazard curves show steep rises and 
falls with some flatness in couple of time intervals, thus it’s inappropriate to assume the 
hazard rates to be constant for any defined age group. In this situation it may be appropriate 
to go for fully non-parametric baseline hazard specification and use age specific dummy 
variables to specify the baseline hazard rate. To statistically test our intuition, we estimated 
multivariate discrete hazard models (with logit link) with Event 1, Event 2 and Event 3 
respectively as dependent variable and only age dummies as independent variables. 
Regression results13 confirm that about 90% of age dummies are significant (p-value < 0.05) 
in explaining respective outcome of interest. However, when supplemented with financial 
covariates, only about 10% of the age dummies remain statistically significant with large 
value of standard errors of their coefficients. This suggests that in presence of financial 
covariates, hazard rates do not show duration dependence.  Additionally, one also needs to 
consider that too many variables may make the multivariate model numerically unstable. 
Thus, following Shumway (2001) we re-estimate these models using natural logarithm of 
firms annual age (variable AGE in Table 9) as baseline hazard specification. In contrast to 
Shumway's (2001) results, AGE is significant in most of our multivariate hazard models. In 
light  of   this  discussion  we  use  natural   logarithm  of  firms’  age  (AGE)  to  proxy  the  baseline  
hazard rate for all our multivariate models developed. 
 [Insert Figure 1 Here] 
5.3.2 Model-Building Strategy 
The criteria for including a covariate in the multivariate model often vary across scientific 
disciplines,  but  they  all  strive  to  develop  the  ‘best’  model  that  is  numerically  stable  and  can  
be easily adapted for real life applications. The standard error of a model increases with the 
increase in the number of covariates, and this also makes the model more dependent on the 
                                                 
13 These results are not reports in this paper; however, it may be made available from the authors. 
P A G E  | 24                                                                                                                              
 
observed data. Thus the objective should be to employ a minimum number of covariates for a 
desired accuracy level. A good start is to perform univariate regressions of each covariate in 
turn and consider the covariates with p-values of less than 0.25 for developing multivariate 
models (see chapter 4 of Hosmer Jr et al. 2013).  Another school of thought suggests 
inclusion of all theoretically motivated covariates in the multivariate model irrespective of 
their significance level in the univariate analysis. Some studies exclude insignificant 
predictors (p-value > 0.05) from their multivariate models, yet insignificant predictors may 
explain some of the variation of the dependent variable. Multicollinearity can be a serious 
issue that may make the model unstable if not addressed effectively. Thus, at first we rank  
the covariates in Table 7 based on the magnitude of their AME (covariate having highest 
value of |AME| gets rank 1 and so on) and then introduce each covariate in turn into the 
multivariate setup starting with the covariate having the highest rank (rank = 1 in Table 7). 
The rationale being, the higher the value of AME, the higher the change in the predicted 
probability due to unit changes in the covariate’s  value. Thus a covariate with higher value of 
AME (e.g. FETA in Table 7) is more efficient in discriminating between distressed and 
censored firms than a covariate with lower value of AME (e.g. TLTA in Table 7). Further, we 
exclude a covariate from the multivariate model if, when introduced, (i) it affects the sign14 of 
any previously added covariate, (ii) it bears the opposite sign than expected, (iii) it bears the 
expected sign but has a p-value greater than 0.25 and (iv) it makes a previously added 
covariate insignificant with a p-value greater than 0.25. These may primarily arise due to 
multicollinearity among covariates, thus our screening mechanism seems to be a reasonable 
choice. Moreover, we believe that this method of covariate introduction while developing 
multivariate models reasonably addresses the multicollineariy problem and leaves us with a 
‘best’ set of covariates that explain the variance of the dependent variable. Using discrete 
hazard model with logit link, this process is applied to Event 1, Event 2 and Event 3 
respectively for all three (T – 1, T – 2 and T – 3) respective lagged time periods. Then, 
multivariate hazard models with cloglog link and extended Cox are estimated using the same 
set of covariates selected using logit link to see any differences that may arise due to different 
estimation methods. 
The final set of multivariate hazard models reported in Table 9 are estimated using all 
observation available to us covering the entire sampling period, thus we do not have separate 
test and hold-out samples. In order to assess within-sample classification performance of the 
                                                 
14 Coefficients with negative sign become positive and vice versa.  
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models developed we estimate area under ROC (AUROC) curve for respective models using 
the full estimation sample. For out-of-sample validation, we first estimate multivariate hazard 
model using observation till the year 2011 and using these estimates we predict the default 
probabilities for the year 2012; then we include 2012 into the estimation sample and predict 
default probabilities for 2013 and so on, till the year 2015. Then we use these predicted 
probabilities from the year 2012 through 2015 to estimate out-of-sample AUROC for 
respective multivariate hazard models.   
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
5.3.3 Hazard Models for Event 1 
The binary dependent variable used is Event 1, i.e. firms that filed for legal bankruptcy 
proceedings are considered to have experienced the default event and censored otherwise 
(please see section 3 for detailed discussion). Section A of Table 9 reports multivariate 
hazard models estimated for T – 1, T – 2 and T – 3 lagged time periods developed using 
respective econometric specification. As we see, the logit estimates of factors affecting the 
outcome probability of Event 1 vary considerably across time periods, except FETA. 
However, the control variables Micro, Small, RISK1 and AGE are strongly significant across 
all time periods. Among five Altman and Sabato's (2007) covariates, EBITDATA and RETA 
fail to find a place in our multivariate models for all three time periods. Additionally, 
STDEBV, CTA and EBITDAIE do not show consistency in their explanatory power. As seen 
in univariate regression, here as well coefficients of EBITDAIE are almost 0. This clearly 
shows the inefficiency of  Altman and Sabato's (2007) covariate in predicting corporate 
bankruptcies for SMEs. The statistical significance of most of the covariates do not vary 
considerably when estimated using cloglog and Cox specification except STDEBV, CAG and 
SAG, however most of the covariates follows the pattern |logit| > |cloglog| > |Cox|. This 
suggests cloglog and Cox estimates undermine the effect of covariates on the outcome 
probability. However, AIC values of logit and cloglog estimate are almost identical and are 
about half of Cox estimates. This clearly suggests that discrete-time hazard models offer 
much superior model fit than continuous extended Cox model. However, the within-sample 
AUROC for all econometric specifications are almost identical with slight variation among 
estimates of hold-out sample (see Figure 2). This suggests no significant loss in the 
classification performance if one uses Cox specification over discrete-time. Additionally, the 
AUROC of all our multivariate models developed are around 0.8 or higher, which is 
considered to be excellent. But the shape of ROC curves of hold-out sample estimates are 
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steps rather than concave due to very low number of outcome events in out-of-sample 
validation15.  
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
5.3.4 Hazard Models for Event 2 
Unlike Event 1, multivariate models developed for Event 2 using logit specification show 
consistent explanatory power of most covariates over all three lagged time periods (see 
Section B of Table 9). Here as well the pattern |logit| > |cloglog| > |Cox| holds good for most 
of the explanatory variables. However, the statistical significance of SAG (T – 1) and AGE (T 
– 1 and T – 3) varies with the estimation technique. All control variables (Small, Medium and 
RISK2) are also highly significant across all lagged time periods. Among Altman and 
Sabato's (2007) covariates, STDEBV, EBITDATA and EBITDAIE exhibit significant 
explanatory power across all lagged time periods and econometric specifications. However, 
the coefficient of EBITDAIE is almost 0 here as well. The variable CTA finds place only in 
the models developed for T – 2 time periods, while RETA fails to meet our screening criteria 
for inclusion into the multivariate model. Thus, Altman and Sabato's (2007) covariates are 
not efficient predictors of financial distress unlike some of the other financial ratios reported 
in Section B of Table 9. Here as well AIC values of discrete hazard models are about three to 
four times lower than Cox models, thus discrete-time hazard models offer superior model fit 
than their continuous counterpart. The within sample and hold-out sample AUROC estimated 
for different multivariate models are about or higher than 0.80 suggesting excellent 
classification performance of our multivariate models across all time periods and econometric 
specifications (see Figure 2). 
5.3.5 Hazard Models for Event 3 
The set of hazard models that we estimate is based on the default definition (Event 3) that we 
propose  in  this  study,  which  considers  both  legal  bankruptcy  filing  and  firms’  financial  health  
while classifying SMEs as default (please see section 2 for details). Section C of Table 9 
reports multivariate regression estimates for Event 3 across all three lagged time periods and 
respective econometric specifications. A look at the results reveals that factors affecting 
outcome probability vary reasonably across time periods. Even statistical significance of six 
covariates (STDEBV, OPCE, RETA, CAG, SAG and TTA) is sensitive to estimation 
                                                 
15 This might result in misleading estimates of AUROC. Thus one needs to be careful while drawing inferences 
regarding out-of-sample predictive ability of the forecasting model. 
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technique. Among Altman and Sabato's (2007) covariates STDEBV finds place in T – 2 and 
T – 3, while RETA finds place in T – 1 only. EBITDATA, CTA and EBITDAIE fail to meet 
our inclusion criteria into the multivariate setup. This reinforces the inefficiency of covariates 
suggested by Altman and Sabato's (2007) in predicting SMEs financial distress. Here as well 
the AIC values are in favour of discrete-time models, which are about 0.8 times lower than 
continuous Cox estimates. Both within sample and hold-out sample classification of all the 
multivariate models across all time periods and econometric specifications are close to or 
above 0.9, which is superior to Event 1 and Event 2 models’  classification  performance (see 
Figure 2). 
5.3.6 Comparative Performance of Hazard Models 
As reported in Table 9, the extended Cox model performs almost identical to discrete-time 
models with logit and clog-log links as its shows almost identical classification performance 
across all default definitions. Thus one might be indifferent in her choice of hazard 
specification. However, the coefficients of most covariates in all multivariate models show 
the pattern, |logit| > |cloglog| > |Cox|. This means that absolute   value   of   a   covariate’s  
coefficient is highest when estimated using discrete-hazard logit specification and lowest 
when estimated continuous Cox specification. Thus for a unit change in the value of a 
covariate, logit estimates lead to highest change in the outcome probability than its alternative 
counterparts. Hence we suggest the use of discrete-time hazard model with logit link to 
model interval censored data. But, if the event of interest is not duration dependent (i.e. some 
functional form of time or time dummies are not significant in the multivariate model) with 
the hazard rates being invariant or varies mildly across different time periods, then getting 
involved into complications of hazard models is not rewarding considering the marginal gain 
one would obtain using such models. As reported earlier, in presence of other financial 
covariates about 90% of time dummies that we use as baseline hazard specification are 
insignificant with very high values of standard errors. Thus we use natural logarithm of firms 
annual age as baseline hazard specification, but such objective can easily be achieved by 
developing regression models using a panel logistic regression technique that uses some 
functional form of time to capture any duration dependency. Although Shumway (2001) 
argue that hazard models are superior to competing static models but AGE variable in his 
multivariate models are insignificant, then how can it be used to reliably predict duration 
specific hazard rate, which is why hazard models are primarily used. Unlike other scientific 
disciplines like medicine or health economics, duration specific prediction of hazard rates is 
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not common in bankruptcy/financial distress prediction studies, thus we do not see any real 
need of hazard models if similar objective can be achieved using much simpler logistic 
regression that controls for any duration dependencies, as both involve identical statistical 
estimation methods. Another interesting observation is the classification performance 
measures across different default definitions. Based on the AUROC measures, Event 1 is the 
weakest definition of default while Event 3 is the strongest as it has highest values of 
AUROC across all time periods. Also, the AIC measure of Event 3 models are the lowest 
among the three default definitions, which indicates that Event 3 default definition provides a 
vastly improved fit than the other two competing default definitions.   
6. Conclusion 
The use of hazard models in estimating bankruptcy prediction is gathering momentum in the 
finance academic literature. Unfortunately, vast majority of previous studies suffer from at 
least one of the following shortcomings: (i) reason behind their choice between discrete-time 
or continuous-time hazard model (ii) inappropriate specification of baseline hazard rate (iii) 
no test of proportional hazards assumption when using Extended Cox model with time-
independent covariates (iv) ignore frailty and recurrent events, or (v) explanation on how 
they dealt with the issues of delayed entry.  
We contribute to the literature by acknowledging all these common neglected concerns in our 
research, and to our knowledge we are the first academic paper to report performance 
comparison of popular hazard models (discrete hazard models with logit and clog-log links 
and extended Cox model) used in the recent literature (e.g. Campbell et al. 2008, Chen and 
Hill 2013). We also contribute to the literature by undertaking an empirical investigation 
which compares various default definitions of the US SMEs. Three default definitions that we 
compare are based on legal bankruptcy laws (Event 1),  firms’  financial  health  (Event 2) and 
the third definition (Event 3) that we propose in this study considers both legal bankruptcy 
and   firms’   financial   health. Considering the suggestion of Hosmer Jr et al. (2013) on 
multivariate model building strategy, we propose an atheoretical econometric based 
multivariate model  building  strategy  based  on  covariates’  Average Marginal Effects (AME) 
and their inter-temporal discrimination ability. Finally, we provide further contribution to the 
field by examining the efficiency of covariates suggested by the most popular study on SMEs 
bankruptcy by Altman and Sabato (2007) in predicting SMEs bankruptcy across varying 
default definitions and lagged time periods. 
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Our findings highlight almost identical classification performance of both discrete-time 
hazard models and continuous-time Cox model across all three default definitions, suggesting 
insignificant variance of classification performance to econometric specification. Based on 
comparison of AIC measures, discrete hazard models provide considerably superior fit than 
Cox models. However, the AIC measures for both discrete-time hazard models (logit and 
clog-log links) are almost identical; hence the choice between them is left on the personal 
preference of the users. But, if one considers the magnitude of coefficient of respective 
covariates, event outcome probabilities are more sensitive to logit estimates than cloglog and 
Cox estimates. Also, Altman and Sabato's (2007) covariates are unstable and inefficient in 
predicting event outcome across different default definitions and lagged time periods in 
comparison to other competing financial ratios. Furthermore, based on the classification 
performance and AIC values of models developed using different default definitions, we 
understand that the default definition that we propose performs best in identifying distressed 
firms. This emphasises the fact that, a substantial number of firms choose legal bankruptcy 
routes as part of their planned exit strategy. 
Given the importance of hazard models in predicting bankruptcy and the robustness of our 
results in dealing with neglected econometric issues in most previous empirical research in 
bankruptcy related survival analysis, we believe this paper makes a significant contribution to 
SMEs and corporate failure literature.     
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Table 1: Survival Table 
Age Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 
1 0 % 1 1 0 % 1 1 0 % 1 
1 8 3,931 0.20 316 3,623 8.02 2 3,937 0.05 
2 13 6,373 0.20 0 6,386 0.00 1 6,385 0.02 
3 28 6,749 0.41 607 6,170 8.96 1 6,776 0.01 
4 41 6,412 0.64 894 5,559 13.85 6 6,447 0.09 
5 52 6,242 0.83 831 5,463 13.20 12 6,282 0.19 
6 47 5,791 0.81 910 4,928 15.59 12 5,826 0.21 
7 56 4,941 1.12 812 4,185 16.25 16 4,981 0.32 
8 48 4,277 1.11 716 3,609 16.55 20 4,305 0.46 
9 54 3,776 1.41 697 3,133 18.20 17 3,813 0.45 
10 50 3,283 1.50 618 2,715 18.54 14 3,319 0.42 
11 35 2,564 1.35 476 2,123 18.31 11 2,588 0.43 
12 25 2,233 1.11 371 1,887 16.43 11 2,247 0.49 
13 24 2,039 1.16 358 1,705 17.35 6 2,057 0.29 
14 19 1,817 1.03 323 1,513 17.59 5 1,831 0.27 
15 15 1,625 0.91 273 1,367 16.65 6 1,634 0.37 
16 10 1,460 0.68 248 1,222 16.87 3 1,467 0.20 
17 11 1,285 0.85 224 1,072 17.28 2 1,294 0.15 
18 7 1,128 0.62 195 940 17.18 3 1,132 0.27 
19 8 1,017 0.78 199 826 19.41 3 1,022 0.29 
20 12 900 1.32 157 755 17.21 4 908 0.44 
21 10 786 1.26 132 664 16.58 1 795 0.13 
22 6 715 0.83 123 598 17.06 0 721 0.00 
23 6 642 0.93 111 537 17.13 1 647 0.15 
24 6 573 1.04 107 472 18.48 0 579 0.00 
25 9 483 1.83 95 397 19.31 3 489 0.61 
26 10 445 2.20 93 362 20.44 3 452 0.66 
27 6 411 1.44 74 343 17.75 5 412 1.21 
28 4 379 1.04 62 321 16.19 0 383 0.00 
29 4 329 1.20 62 271 18.62 1 332 0.30 
30 5 271 1.81 50 226 18.12 2 274 0.73 
31 5 235 2.08 41 199 17.08 1 239 0.42 
32 5 201 2.43 38 168 18.45 1 205 0.49 
33 4 178 2.20 23 159 12.64 1 181 0.55 
34 4 163 2.40 20 147 11.98 1 166 0.60 
35 4 145 2.68 15 134 10.07 0 149 0.00 
36 3 127 2.31 16 114 12.31 0 130 0.00 
37 2 115 1.71 16 101 13.68 1 116 0.86 
38 1 111 0.89 11 101 9.82 0 112 0.00 
39 0 102 0.00 13 89 12.75 0 102 0.00 
40 0 91 0.00 9 82 9.89 0 91 0.00 
41 1 69 1.43 6 64 8.57 0 70 0.00 
42 0 45 0.00 0 45 0.00 0 45 0.00 
43 0 46 0.00 3 43 6.52 0 46 0.00 
44 0 41 0.00 3 38 7.32 0 41 0.00 
45 0 36 0.00 2 34 5.56 0 36 0.00 
46 0 30 0.00 3 27 10.00 0 30 0.00 
47 0 27 0.00 2 25 7.41 0 27 0.00 
48 0 23 0.00 0 23 0.00 0 23 0.00 
49 0 23 0.00 1 22 4.35 0 23 0.00 
50 0 20 0.00 1 19 5.00 0 20 0.00 
51 0 19 0.00 1 18 5.26 0 19 0.00 
52 0 14 0.00 2 12 14.29 0 14 0.00 
53 0 11 0.00 0 11 0.00 0 11 0.00 
54 0 8 0.00 0 8 0.00 0 8 0.00 
55 0 6 0.00 1 5 16.67 0 6 0.00 
56 0 0 0.00 0 0 0.00 0 0 0.00 
57 0 0 0.00 0 0 0.00 0 0 0.00 
58 0 1 0.00 0 1 0.00 0 1 0.00 
Total 658 74,764 0.87 10,361 65,061 13.74 176 75,246 0.23 
Notes: This table shows the age wise distribution of firm-year observations for respective default events discussed in section 
2.  Numeric  ‘0’  signifies  censorship  and  ‘1’  signifies  that  a  firm  has  experienced  the  respective  default  event.   
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Table 2: Sample Industrial Classification 
Industry Code SIC Code Industry Included/Excluded 
1 < 1000 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing Included 
2 1000 to < 1500 Mining Included 
3 1500 to < 1800 Construction Included 
4 2000 to < 4000 Manufacturing Included 
5 5000 to < 5200 Wholesale Trade Included 
6 5200 to < 6000 Retail Trade Included 
7 7000 to < 8900 Services Included 
Excluded 4000 to < 5000 Transportation, Communications & Public Utilities Excluded 
Excluded 6000 to < 6800 Finance, Insurance & Real Estate Excluded 
Excluded 9100 to < 10000 Public Administration Excluded 
Notes: This table reports Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) of US firms. SIC Code is a four digit code that represents a 
given industrial sectors. The last column reports the industrial sectors that we included or excluded from our sample.  
 
 
  Table 3: List of Covariates 
Category Variable Definition Compustat Data Item 
Leverage STDEBV Short term debt/equity book value DLC/SEQ 
 TLTA Total liabilities/tangible total assets  LT/(AT – INTAN) 
 TLNW Total liabilities/net worth LT/(AT - LT) 
 CETL Capital employed/total liabilities (AT – LCT)/LT 
    
Liquidity CTA Cash and short-term investments/total assets CHE/AT 
 CR Current Ratio; current assets/current liabilities ACT/LCT 
 QR Quick Ratio; (current assets – stocks - prepayments)/current liabilities 
(ACT – INVT – 
XPP)/LCT 
 CHR Cash Ratio; (cash + bank + marketable securities)/current liabilities CHE/LCT 
    
Financing FETA Financial expenses/total assets XINT/AT 
 FES Financial expenses/sales XINT/SALE 
 RETA Retained earnings/total assets RE/AT 
 EBITDAIE Earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization/interest expense EBITDA/XINT 
    
Profitability EBITDATA Earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization/total assets EBITDA/AT 
 OPCE Operating profit/capital employed EBIT/(AT - LCT) 
 ROE Return on equity; Net profit/equity NI/SEQ 
 NIS Net income/sales NI/SALE 
 OPNI Operating profit/net income EBIT/NI 
    
Activity SHP Stock holding period; (stock × 365)/sales (INVT × 365)/SALE 
 DCP Debtor collection period; (trade debtors × 365)/sales (RECTR × 365)/SALE 
 TCP Trade creditors payment period; (trade creditors × 365)/sales (AP × 365)/SALE 
 WCTA Working capital/total assets WCAP/AT 
 WCS Working capital/sales WCAP/SALE 
 STA Sales/tangible assets SALE/(AT – INTAN) 
    
Growth CAG Capital growth; calculated as (Capitalt / Capitalt-1) - 1 (AT - LCT) 
 SAG Sales growth; calculated as (Salet / Salet-1) - 1 SALE 
 ERG Earnings growth; calculated as (EBITt / EBITt-1) - 1 EBIT 
    
Other TTA Income taxes/total assets TXT/AT 
    
Control Micro No. of employees < 10  
 Small 10 =<  No. of employees < 50  
 RISK Event rate in a given industrial sector in a given year (calculated separately for different Event definition)  
Notes: This table lists the set of covariates along with their respective definition that we use for the empirical analysis. The 
last column lists the specific Compustat data items that we use to calculation the financial covariates.  
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Status Indicator 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
STDEBV 0 0.1889 0.0144 0.4235 0.1843 0.0176 0.3977 0.1893 0.0143 0.4245 
 1 0.1967 0.0000 0.5262 0.2163 0.0000 0.5558 0.0442 -0.0571 0.4291 
OPNI 0 1.1200 1.0058 1.0524 1.1707 1.0338 1.0748 1.1177 1.0050 1.0533 
 1 0.6870 0.6729 1.0861 0.7976 0.8270 0.8516 0.5416 0.4644 0.9635 
TLTA 0 0.6390 0.4978 0.5124 0.5481 0.4325 0.4430 0.6404 0.4993 0.5130 
 1 0.9685 0.8343 0.5879 1.1870 1.0742 0.5578 1.2802 1.3848 0.5885 
TLNW 0 1.0663 0.4885 2.4897 1.0672 0.4964 2.2490 1.0681 0.4890 2.4963 
 1 1.0459 0.3762 3.3770 1.0595 0.1858 3.6364 0.2452 -1.1327 3.4305 
CETL 0 2.5593 1.5343 2.5867 2.8603 1.8361 2.6255 2.5520 1.5274 2.5852 
 1 1.1824 0.5146 1.8534 0.7110 0.3667 1.2149 0.6954 0.1984 1.2239 
CTA 0 0.2346 0.1357 0.2351 0.2425 0.1475 0.2362 0.2343 0.1352 0.2352 
 1 0.1856 0.0660 0.2335 0.1853 0.0747 0.2230 0.1681 0.0578 0.2272 
CR 0 2.8370 1.9516 2.4008 3.0807 2.2228 2.4266 2.8311 1.9443 2.4002 
 1 1.6869 0.9452 1.9695 1.3366 0.8283 1.5489 1.3542 0.6025 1.6870 
QR 0 2.1085 1.2028 2.1818 2.3227 1.3980 2.2275 2.1027 1.1982 2.1804 
 1 1.1411 0.4881 1.6776 0.8220 0.3966 1.2752 0.9004 0.3045 1.4141 
CHR 0 1.4273 0.4502 1.9092 1.5658 0.5720 1.9647 1.4240 0.4478 1.9081 
 1 0.8188 0.0984 1.5851 0.5769 0.0900 1.2250 0.6384 0.0572 1.4420 
FETA 0 0.0294 0.0172 0.0324 0.0244 0.0136 0.0285 0.0295 0.0173 0.0324 
 1 0.0507 0.0474 0.0381 0.0583 0.0591 0.0375 0.0602 0.0689 0.0402 
FES 0 0.0611 0.0192 0.0953 0.0509 0.0157 0.0854 0.0613 0.0193 0.0954 
 1 0.0982 0.0510 0.1087 0.1227 0.0624 0.1237 0.1235 0.0608 0.1222 
EBITDAIE 0 99.092 -0.0423 537.480 120.948 1.2368 576.057 98.612 -0.0524 536.500 
 1 22.388 -0.7447 333.325 -24.179 -3.723 166.108 20.568 -0.6260 312.090 
EBITDATA 0 -0.2248 -0.0043 0.6142 -0.1498 0.0266 0.5294 -0.2250 -0.0045 0.6141 
 1 -0.3060 -0.0438 0.6628 -0.6531 -0.2799 0.8446 -0.4394 -0.0765 0.7822 
OPCE 0 -0.1001 -0.0052 0.4090 -0.0905 0.0025 0.3881 -0.1003 -0.0057 0.4091 
 1 -0.1207 -0.0373 0.4296 -0.1573 -0.1130 0.5120 -0.0597 -0.0003 0.4276 
ROE 0 -0.1204 0.0105 0.5801 -0.1293 0.0080 0.5361 -0.1202 0.0104 0.5809 
 1 -0.0163 0.0411 0.6791 -0.0624 0.0754 0.7918 0.1536 0.1829 0.6011 
NIS 0 -0.4445 -0.0374 0.7868 -0.3881 -0.0069 0.7603 -0.4451 -0.0382 0.7866 
 1 -0.5511 -0.2287 0.7520 -0.7995 -0.4063 0.8510 -0.5537 -0.2568 0.7432 
RETA 0 -1.5313 -0.4904 2.2310 -1.2142 -0.3045 2.0203 -1.5314 -0.4929 2.2298 
 1 -2.0233 -1.0498 2.2862 -3.3941 -3.1440 2.4774 -3.2022 -2.7933 2.4772 
SHP 0 50.132 35.532 51.986 49.777 35.764 51.378 50.134 35.536 51.986 
 1 49.579 31.523 52.770 52.287 33.687 55.590 46.837 22.446 54.655 
DCP 0 63.907 55.077 49.284 64.987 56.112 48.985 63.873 55.017 49.304 
 1 59.123 46.274 53.136 57.293 47.770 50.741 60.949 49.949 55.460 
TCP 0 168.668 35.971 532.046 146.338 33.444 485.965 168.499 35.982 531.456 
 1 187.043 40.940 558.262 306.849 58.592 742.050 308.623 50.766 801.227 
WCTA 0 0.2370 0.2774 0.3594 0.2857 0.3245 0.3327 0.2357 0.2760 0.3598 
 1 -0.0152 -0.0288 0.3790 -0.0645 -0.0845 0.3707 -0.1111 -0.2199 0.3810 
WCS 0 0.4157 0.2371 0.6494 0.4689 0.2735 0.6404 0.4140 0.2357 0.6496 
 1 0.0812 -0.0269 0.5831 0.0657 -0.0388 0.5965 -0.0504 -0.1886 0.4929 
STA 0 1.0735 0.8915 0.9189 1.0633 0.8915 0.8993 1.0737 0.8912 0.9192 
 1 1.1171 0.8864 0.9830 1.1347 0.8914 1.0262 1.1383 0.9604 1.0089 
CAG 0 0.1639 0.0292 0.6464 0.1924 0.0469 0.6229 0.1621 0.0283 0.6465 
 1 -0.0889 -0.2126 0.6427 0.0053 -0.2042 0.7368 -0.0191 -0.1314 0.7247 
SAG 0 0.1788 0.0815 0.4423 0.1906 0.0955 0.4327 0.1776 0.0804 0.4424 
 1 -0.0170 -0.1309 0.4161 0.1033 -0.0326 0.4852 -0.0466 -0.1897 0.4138 
ERG 0 -0.0394 -0.0681 1.3143 -0.0439 -0.0420 1.3478 -0.0407 -0.0695 1.3150 
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 1 -0.2671 -0.3645 1.3192 -0.0295 -0.1764 1.1325 -0.3475 -0.4978 1.1091 
TTA 0 0.0130 0.0000 0.0282 0.0148 0.0000 0.0296 0.0130 0.0000 0.0282 
 1 0.0061 0.0000 0.0222 0.0020 0.0000 0.0140 0.0037 0.0000 0.0167 
Notes: This table reports mean, median and standard deviation for healthy (censored; status indicator = 0) and unhealthy 
(firms which experienced default event; status indicator = 1) groups of firms for respective covariates under different 
definitions of default events as discussed in section 2.  
 
 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
STDEBV 1 1        
TLTA 2 0.0780 1       
CETL 3 -0.2986 -0.6772 1      
CTA 4 -0.2670 -0.3276 0.4829 1     
FETA 5 0.1943 0.7093 -0.5344 -0.3343 1    
FES 6 0.0084 0.4339 -0.2462 -0.0563 0.6230 1   
EBITDAIE 7 -0.1004 -0.1983 0.2729 0.1330 -0.2071 -0.1508 1  
EBITDATA 8 0.1278 -0.4223 0.1548 -0.1694 -0.2899 -0.3963 0.2129 1 
OPCE 9 -0.1097 0.0783 -0.0390 -0.2278 0.0482 -0.1084 0.2402 0.3127 
NIS 10 0.1112 -0.2128 -0.0345 -0.2941 -0.172 -0.5105 0.2517 0.6920 
RETA 11 0.1292 -0.5031 0.2299 -0.1590 -0.3409 -0.3353 0.1872 0.6588 
WCTA 12 -0.1851 -0.7413 0.5870 0.5451 -0.5782 -0.4074 0.1994 0.3148 
WCS 13 -0.2144 -0.5619 0.6392 0.7005 -0.4397 -0.1252 0.0593 0.0360 
CAG 14 -0.0992 -0.1505 0.1613 0.1336 -0.1323 -0.0293 0.0540 0.1490 
SAG 15 -0.0117 -0.0651 0.0448 0.0833 -0.0868 -0.0430 0.0225 0.0375 
TTA 16 -0.0680 -0.1870 0.0894 -0.0085 -0.1813 -0.2153 0.2993 0.3199 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
OPCE 9 1        
NIS 10 0.4705 1       
RETA 11 0.3057 0.5371 1      
WCTA 12 -0.0633 0.1543 0.3499 1     
WCS 13 -0.2574 -0.2318 0.1047 0.7403 1    
CAG 14 0.2161 0.0921 0.1658 0.1969 0.1783 1   
SAG 15 0.0424 0.0061 0.0497 0.0554 0.0676 0.2730 1  
TTA 16 0.4175 0.3232 0.2985 0.2158 -0.0259 0.1345 0.0971 1 
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Table 6: Event 2 Univariate Regression 
Variable Sign T – 1 T – 2 T – 3 
β SE AME % β SE AME % β SE AME  % 
STDEBV      + 0.1700a 0.0298 1.05a 0.3928a 0.0312 2.84a 0.3225a 0.0329 2.72a 
OPNI            - -0.3627a 0.0147 -2.32a -0.3323a 0.0150 -2.48a -0.1608a 0.0146 -1.36a 
TLTA           + 2.4762a a 0.0332 16.59 a 2.2925a 0.0340 17.77a 0.6454a 0.0317 5.78a 
TLNW          + 0.0096b 0.0048 0.05b 0.0349a 0.0050 0.25a 0.0294a 0.0053 0.24a 
CETL           - -0.9832a 0.0175 -7.60a -0.8332a 0.0155 -7.20a -0.2073a 0.0076 -1.87a 
CTA              - -1.9079a 0.0753 -11.67a -2.2780a 0.0882 -16.20a -0.5436a 0.0770 -4.55a 
CR                 - -0.5862a 0.0113 -4.09a -0.5718a 0.0113 -4.60a -0.1559a 0.0077 -1.35a 
QR                 - -0.6774a 0.0179 -4.69a -0.6328a 0.0171 -4.86a -0.1790a 0.0113 -1.51a 
CHR              - -0.5532a 0.0132 -3.55a -0.5760a 0.0138 -4.30a -0.1436a 0.0098 -1.22a 
FETA            + 32.1570a 0.4631 248.01a 24.0993a 0.4610 219.22a 8.8175a 0.4786 84.55a 
FES               + 7.2175a 0.1558 50.52a 6.3882a 0.1665 51.69a 3.7784a 0.1733 33.55a 
EBITDAIE   - -0.0007a 0.0000 -0.00a -0.0020a 0.0001 -0.02a -0.0014a 0.0000 -0.01a 
EBITDATA  - -1.0990a 0.0233 -7.98a -1.5416a 0.0289 -11.39a -0.8150a 0.0276 -7.22a 
OPCE           - -0.1528a 0.0320 -0.94a -1.0082a 0.0351 -7.50a -1.1616a 0.0373 -9.96a 
ROE             - 0.2635a 0.0210 1.64a -0.2591a 0.0219 -1.90a -0.5588a 0.0238 -4.75a 
NIS               - -0.5768a 0.0200 -3.66a -1.0970a 0.0237 -7.89a -0.7226a 0.0229 -5.97a 
RETA           - -0.4931a 0.0078 -3.68a -0.4340a 0.0079 -3.76a -0.1911a 0.0077 -1.81a 
SHP              + -0.0002 0.0000 -0.00 0.0034a 0.0003 0.02a 0.0048a 0.0003 0.04a 
DCP             + -0.0039a 0.0003 -0.02a -0.0023a 0.0003 -0.02a 0.0005 0.0003 0.00 
TCP              + 0.0003a 0.0000 0.00a 0.0003a 0.0000 0.00a 0.001a 0.0000 0.00a 
WCTA          - -3.2430a 0.0500 -22.62a -3.1762a 0.0517 -25.47a -0.8462a 0.0462 -7.44a 
WCS             - -1.5370a 0.0335 -9.60a -1.4041a 0.0336 -10.04a -0.1892a 0.0276 -1.50a 
STA              + 0.2387a 0.0184 1.44a 0.0406b 0.0199 0.28b -0.2551a 0.0215 -2.10a 
CAG             - -0.4236a 0.0210 -3.12a -1.1145a 0.0271 -9.68a -0.4648a 0.0240 -3.78a 
SAG              - -0.4975a 0.0321 -3.42a -0.8480 0.0351 -6.76a -0.3526a 0.0356 -2.70a 
ERG              - -0.0145 0.0104 -0.10 -0.0009 0.0108 -0.00 -0.0331a 0.0116 -0.26a 
TTA              - -24.5294a 0.8286 -166.40a -46.0535a 1.2150 -370.58a -28.3887a 0.9206 -255.68a 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table reports univariate regression 
estimates of respective covariates at respective lagged time periods, estimated using discrete-time hazard model 
with logit link and Event 2 = 1  as  outcome  event.  ‘Sign’  represents  expected  sign  of  regression  coefficients,  β is 
the regression coefficient, SE is standard error and AME is Average Marginal Effects in percentage.  
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Table 7: Final Set of Covariates 
Variable Sign T – 1 T – 2 T – 3 
β Rank   AME % β Rank AME % β Rank AME % 
STDEBV + 0.1700a 14 1.05a 0.3928a 15 2.84a 0.3225a 11 2.72a 
TLTA + 2.4762a  5 16.59 a 2.2925a 5 17.77a 0.6454a 8 5.78a 
CETL - -0.9832a 9 -7.60a -0.8332a 12 -7.20a -0.2073a 13 -1.87a 
CTA - -1.9079a 6 -11.67a -2.2780a 6 -16.20a -0.5436a 9 -4.55a 
FETA + 32.1570a 1 248.01a 24.0993a 2 219.22a 8.8175a 2 84.55a 
FES + 7.2175a 3 50.52a 6.3882a 3 51.69a 3.7784a 3 33.55a 
EBITDAIE - -0.0007a 16 -0.00a -0.0020a 16 -0.02a -0.0014a 16 -0.01a 
EBITDATA - -1.0990a 8 -7.98a -1.5416a 7 -11.39a -0.8150a 6 -7.22a 
OPCE - -0.1528a 15 -0.94a -1.0082a 11 -7.50a -1.1616a 4 -9.96a 
NIS - -0.5768a 11 -3.66a -1.0970a 10 -7.89a -0.7226a 7 -5.97a 
RETA - -0.4931a 10 -3.68a -0.4340a 14 -3.76a -0.1911a 14 -1.81a 
WCTA - -3.2430a 4 -22.62a -3.1762a 4 -25.47a -0.8462a 5 -7.44a 
WCS - -1.5370a 7 -9.60a -1.4041a 8 -10.04a -0.1892a 15 -1.50a 
CAG - -0.4236a 13 -3.12a -1.1145a 9 -9.68a -0.4648a 10 -3.78a 
SAG - -0.4975a 12 -3.42a -0.8480 13 -6.76a -0.3526a 12 -2.70a 
TTA - -24.5294a 2 -166.40a -46.0535a 1 -370.58a -28.3887a 1 -255.68a 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table reports the final set of 
covariates that we use for multivariate hazard analysis. This excludes covariates reported in Table 6 that are not 
significant in all three time periods or are significant but exhibit Average Marginal Effects (AME) of less than 
5%  in  all  three  time  periods.  It  also  includes  all  covariates  of  Altman  and  Sabato’s  (2007)  study  irrespective  of  
their  significance  or  AME  values.  ‘Sign’  represents  expected  sign of regression coefficients, β is the regression 
coefficient, SE is standard error and AME is Average Marginal Effects in percentage. Rank is based on the 
absolute values of AME, where highest value gets 1, second highest get 2 and so on. 
 
 
Table 8: Univariate Regression 
Section A: Event 1  
Variable 
logit clog-log Cox 
T – 1 T – 2 T – 3 T – 1 T – 2 T – 3 T – 1 T – 2 T – 3 
TLTA          
β 1.6496a 0.9402a 0.5690a 1.4897a 0.8714a 0.5411a 1.2130a 0.5792a 0.2296c 
SE 0.1164 0.1183 0.1230 0.1031 0.1060 0.1168 0.1111 0.1153 0.1312 
AIC 4866.94 4711.79 4394.56 4865.63 4713.43 4398.85 16902.86 16511.26 15864.87 
CETL          
β -0.4373a -0.3022a -0.2104a -0.4068a -0.2801a -0.1931a -0.3974a -0.2629a -0.1569a 
SE 0.0424 0.0371 0.0346 0.0393 0.0340 0.0316 0.0396 0.0324 0.0337 
AIC 5125.48 4966.65 4650.35 5125.60 4971.34 4663.57 17225.83 17114.84 16301.24 
CTA          
β -1.5618a -2.4716a -2.0885a -1.3537a -2.0737a -1.7839a -1.6333a -2.3980a -1.9371a 
SE 0.2933 0.3325 0.3420 0.2617 0.2903 0.3031 0.2818 0.3004 0.3151 
AIC 5546.80 5240.32 4859.45 5552.50 5253.27 4870.86 18900.08 18084.53 16885.00 
FETA          
β 21.9980a 16.2405a 12.2258a 19.737a 14.708a 11.454a 17.330a 11.251a 7.526a 
SE 1.6891 1.7580 1.9064 1.5101 1.5475 1.6837 1.572 1.598 1.753 
AIC 5028.53 4975.84 4634.43 5033.99 4976.34 4636.87 16649.44 16779.55 16034.27 
FES          
β 4.6120a 4.2092a 3.4310a 4.2783a 3.9209a 3.3885a 4.0081a 3.4730a 2.6573a 
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SE 0.5815 0.6150 0.6842 0.5280 0.5521 0.6161 0.601 0.6159 0.6763 
AIC 4907.00 4804.39 4458.37 4913.86 4812.60 4466.04 16158.28 16259.79 15558.52 
EBITDATA          
β -0.4419a -0.1463 -0.0290 -0.4109a -0.1540 -0.0349 -0.3719a -0.0523 0.0821 
SE 0.0952 0.1106 0.1293 0.0878 0.1021 0.1184 0.0987 0.1137 0.1354 
AIC 4943.13 4525.44 3924.66 4944.80 4531.46 3928.27 16900.65 15599.45 13849.46 
OPCE          
β -0.3015a -0.5390a -0.0830 -0.2527b -0.4796a -0.1038 -0.2982b -0.4521a -0.0438 
SE 0.1351 0.1428 0.1560 0.1236 0.1302 0.1389 0.1304 0.1338 0.1444 
AIC 5180.19 5010.50 4688.66 5185.94 5020.43 4698.28 17676.46 17420.71 16541.07 
NIS          
β -0.4056a -0.3281a -0.1338 -0.3923a -0.3229a -0.1613b -0.4466a -0.3397a -0.1647b 
SE 0.0759 0.0809 0.0887 0.0696 0.0732 0.0795 0.0752 0.0779 0.0841 
AIC 5130.54 5021.24 4681.91 5138.88 5032.81 4696.54 17108.88 17131.33 16317.38 
WCTA          
β -2.3753a -1.5757a -1.0011a -2.1715a -1.4630a -0.9621a -2.0940a -1.2861a -0.6302a 
SE 0.1790 0.1790 0.1188 0.1616 0.1615 0.1717 0.1738 0.1723 0.1805 
AIC 5004.96 4924.59 4641.70 5012.94 4929.73 4649.67 16388.07 16688.53 16071.58 
WCS          
β -1.1173a -0.7756a -0.4955a -1.0632a -0.7286a -0.4557a -1.1180a -0.7139a -0.3625a 
SE 0.1230 0.1185 0.1190 0.1155 0.1083 0.1089 0.1262 0.1190 0.1210 
AIC 4827.48 4722.42 4436.58 4834.08 4730.81 4450.76 15642.71 15998.45 15491.13 
CAG          
β -0.7359a -0.5442a -0.2251b -0.6653a -0.5101a -0.2557a -0.4378a -0.2648a -0.0032 
SE 0.0991 0.1015 0.0986 0.0910 0.0914 0.0883 0.0863 0.0840 0.0826 
AIC 4939.88 4600.72 4203.41 4947.41 4606.36 4208.70 17167.37 16333.60 15133.20 
SAG          
β -1.2002a -0.7332a -0.4815a -1.1010a -0.6863a -0.4584a -0.5733a -0.1759 0.1238 
SE 0.1472 0.1444 0.1465 0.1348 0.1289 0.1290 0.1312 0.1249 0.1245 
AIC 4850.35 4613.32 4226.02 4857.08 4624.41 4237.87 16259.93 15966.82 15100.79 
TTA          
β -15.279a -19.145a -14.104a -12.914a -16.382a -12.404a -9.151a -10.854a -5.7572a 
SE 2.6195 2.8173 2.7590 2.3253 2.5141 2.455 2.396 2.433 2.3351 
AIC 5364.37 5199.73 4846.44 5373.75 5214.21 4854.49 18084.87 17845.73 16942.59 
STDEBV          
β -0.1305 0.3249a 0.2026c -0.1293 0.2497b 0.1838c 0.0581 0.3164a 0.1792c 
SE 0.1211 0.1127 0.1226 0.1075 0.0984 0.1070 0.1023 0.0949 0.0972 
AIC 5536.37 5259.03 4875.63 5540.88 5267.90 4883.93 18894.16 18123.03 16986.19 
EBITDAIE          
β -0.0005a -0.0007a -0.0007a -0.0005a -0.0006a -0.0007a -0.0005a -0.0007a -0.0007a 
SE 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
AIC 5116.50 4967.77 4579.99 5119.08 4972.20 4587.21 17237.08 17021.55 15996.35 
RETA          
β -0.2179a -0.0403 0.0579 -0.2123a -0.0545c 0.0342 -0.0963a 0.0828b 0.2082a 
SE 0.0285 0.0313 0.0363 0.0259 0.0285 0.0326 0.0292 0.0328 0.0377 
AIC 5276.77 5164.54 4789.04 5277.01 5173.25 4802.39 17632.39 17494.17 16569.14 
Section B: Event 2 
TLTA          
β 2.4763a 2.2925a 0.6454a 1.9131a 1.7385a 0.4722a 1.5491a 1.2181a -0.0936a 
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SE 0.0332 0.0340 0.0317 0.02433 0.0249 0.0254 0.0269 0.0263 0.0268 
AIC 39819.01 38592.44 39138.22 40351.88 39033.42 39367.36 169228.88 169676.96 151787.27 
CETL          
β -0.9832a -0.8333a -0.2073a -0.8996a -0.7392a -0.1744a -0.7573a -0.5932a -0.0674a 
SE 0.0175 0.0155 0.0076 0.0154 0.0135 0.0067 0.0153 0.0128 0.0071 
AIC 42936.67 40933.98 41487.03 42838.21 40938.75 41690.80 178868.12 179742.98 163152.60 
CTA          
β -1.9080a -2.2780a -0.5437a -1.5666a -1.8406a -0.4203a -1.3751a -1.5422a -0.1930a 
SE 0.0753 0.0821 0.0770 0.0626 0.0667 0.0632 0.0692 0.0689 0.0691 
AIC 50466.9 47135.76 43106.02 50713.44 47333.51 43285.52 187157.31 186678.96 166773.82 
FETA          
β 32.157a 24.0993a 8.8175a 25.545a 18.576a 6.5496a 19.732a 11.720a 0.3837 
SE 0.4632 0.4610 0.4786 0.3534 0.3537 0.3826 0.3847 0.3743 0.3990 
AIC 44019.66 43860.67 41314.35 44370.10 44184.51 41531.49 181845.91 185102.80 163025.31 
FES          
β 7.2176a 6.3882a 3.7784a 5.5920a 4.7768a 2.8066a 4.8881a 3.7060a 1.8270a 
SE 0.1558 0.1665 0.1733 0.1181 0.1252 0.1355 0.1368 0.1371 0.1472 
AIC 42745.25 40838.36 37532.89 43045.40 41128.05 37750.06 161702.51 162744.67 144887.85 
EBITDATA          
β -1.0991a -1.5416a -0.8150a -0.8326a -1.1046a -0.5830a -0.6991a -0.8538a -0.3375a 
SE 0.0233 0.0288 0.0275 0.0173 0.0200 0.0206 0.0195 0.0203 0.0221 
AIC 46126.68 39795.64 36760.93 46499.05 40255.74 37028.58 177955.61 165151.81 143739.48 
OPCE          
β -0.1529a -1.0081a -1.1616a -0.0848a -0.7633a -0.8937a -0.1837a -0.6900a -0.7763a 
SE 0.0320 0.0351 0.0374 0.0268 0.0284 0.0296 0.0269 0.0274 0.0291 
AIC 49958.13 46026.44 41098.81 50193.82 46327.37 41345.69 183139.45 182568.16 161874.04 
NIS          
β -0.5768a -1.0970a -0.7226a -0.4656a -0.8509a -0.5663a -0.5472a -0.9142a -0.5837a 
SE 0.0201 0.0237 0.0229 0.0165 0.0181 0.0181 0.0192 0.0197 0.0203 
AIC 45352.45 40878.51 38124.25 45592.83 41159.19 38350.81 164494.07 162248.50 146980.02 
WCTA          
β -3.2430a -3.1762a -0.8462a -2.6079a -2.4827a -0.6387a -2.1781a -1.8792a -0.0260 
SE 0.0490 0.0516 0.0461 0.0379 0.0391 0.0376 0.0413 0.0404 0.0403 
AIC 44180.67 41937.58 41577.89 44532.85 42262.79 41793.63 178733.60 179140.35 161417.71 
WCS          
β -1.5368a -1.4041a -0.1892a -1.3067a -1.1611a -0.1411a -0.9721a -0.7765a 0.1827a 
SE 0.0336 0.0336 0.0276 0.0282 0.0276 0.0227 0.0286 0.0270 0.0245 
AIC 41981.14 39752.62 37887.54 42170.25 39923.35 38056.91 158354.53 158024.93 142668.54 
CAG          
β -0.4236a -1.1145a -0.4648a -0.3359a -0.9067a -0.3640a -0.1901a -0.6554a -0.1948a 
SE 0.0209 0.0271 0.0240 0.0177 0.0230 0.0199 0.0170 0.0218 0.0194 
AIC 46446.14 40032.58 36510.56 46667.55 40334.54 36707.40 182447.86 161571.4 142418.85 
SAG          
β -0.4975a -0.8480a -0.3526a -0.4018a -0.6950a -0.2773a -0.0007 -0.2608a 0.0784a 
SE 0.0321 0.0351 0.0356 0.0266 0.0292 0.0291 0.0263 0.0286 0.0288 
AIC 42940.24 38469.84 34404.26 43119.91 38641.54 34566.08 163908.56 147657.20 130515.75 
TTA          
β -24.529a -46.053a -28.388a -21.440a -39.567a -25.191a -16.111a -32.700a -17.570a 
SE 0.8287 1.2150 0.9206 0.7345 1.0230 0.8199 0.7956 1.0520 0.8362 
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AIC 49823.67 45309.29 41671.94 50062.04 45472.27 41817.08 186556.15 185582.80 165637.98 
STDEBV          
β 0.1701a 0.3928a 0.3226a 0.1142a 0.2924a 0.2537a 0.2214a 0.3352a 0.3159a 
SE 0.0299 0.0312 0.0329 0.0250 0.0252 0.0261 0.0248 0.0243 0.0261 
AIC 50832.49 47532.22 42826.97 51068.9 47749.17 43001.94 186510.11 185977.43 165771.45 
EBITDAIE          
β -0.0007a -0.0020a -0.0014a -0.0006a -0.0016a -0.0013a -0.0008a -0.0021a -0.0014a 
SE 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.00004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
AIC 49315.06 45838.27 41007.13 49550 46036.04 41161.93 184043.20 185078.73 162333.72 
RETA          
β -0.4932a -0.4340a -0.1911a -0.3929a -0.3403a -0.1501a -0.2244a -0.1383a 0.0965a 
SE 0.0078 0.0079 0.0077 0.0059 0.0061 0.0062 0.0068 0.0068 0.0072 
AIC 45778.64 44205.43 42160.60 46152.58 44510.55 42364.95 185095.29 185404.33 165212.43 
          
Section C: Event 3 
TLTA          
β 2.2613a 2.2702a 1.7594a 2.0836a 2.0658a 1.6174a 1.9450a 1.7950a 1.0670a 
SE 0.2104 0.2194 0.2057 0.1874 0.1927 0.1835 0.2118 0.2594 0.2529 
AIC 1672.94 1605.55 1607.53 1678.16 1606.31 1612.21 8793.33 11036.43 11439.28 
CETL          
β -0.8100a -1.3677a -1.0503a -0.7819a -1.2917a -0.9926a -0.5795a -1.1940a -0.8392a 
SE 0.1256 0.1756 0.1501 0.1204 0.1596 0.1352 0.1162 0.1653 0.1334 
AIC 1807.22 1713.77 1705.97 1812.53 1715.99 1709.98 11896.03 8558.01 8911.28 
CTA          
β -1.2774b -2.7134a -3.1083a -1.0860b -2.3802a -2.7352a -1.3870a -2.8200a -2.7380a 
SE 0.4999 0.5819 0.6234 0.4575 0.5207 0.5522 0.5584 0.6180 0.6329 
AIC 1956.25 1879.62 1829.70 1964.16 1889.12 1839.38 13023.02 12597.72 12360.73 
FETA          
β 24.262a 29.334a 28.935a 21.696a 27.067a 26.671a 20.470a 24.470a 21.970a 
SE 2.8578 3.0460 3.2041 2.5710 2.7135 2.8383 3.0910 3.2460 3.3690 
AIC 1782.76 1768.11 1734.50 1792.13 1772.51 1737.39 11905.15 11712.32 11686.16 
FES          
β 5.9683a 5.9914a 6.2774a 5.6128a 5.5103a 5.8787a 5.8460a 5.7780a 5.9680a 
SE 0.9425 0.9578 1.0459 0.8731 0.8526 0.9317 1.2450 1.2390 1.2920 
AIC 1683.05 1720.33 1663.62 1688.37 1726.73 1670.39 11989.54 12111.67 11787.72 
EBITDATA          
β -0.6521a -0.7622a -0.8135a -0.6212a -0.6576a -0.7441a -0.4909a -0.4434a -0.7848a 
SE 0.1534 0.1749 0.1794 0.1428 0.1497 0.1628 0.1799 0.1988 0.2319 
AIC 1719.03 1598.20 1437.74 1724.62 1599.91 1444.79 12248.42 11576.53 10713.39 
OPCE          
β 0.4351c -0.0031 -0.5827b 0.4065c -0.0273 -0.5849a 0.2023 -0.0342 -0.6290c 
SE 0.2456 0.2434 0.2499 0.2257 0.2239 0.2246 0.2418 0.2353 0.2484 
AIC 1842.11 1840.29 1798.55 1848.99 1848.20 1807.13 12810.22 12672.58 12406.50 
NIS          
β -0.1690 -0.5182a -0.6758a -0.1570 -0.4651a -0.6240a -0.2152 -0.5197a -0.7127a 
SE 0.1341 0.1321 0.1387 0.1235 0.1172 0.1219 0.1566 0.1499 0.1585 
AIC 1748.85 1759.28 1689.10 1757.05 1766.78 1697.26 12644.75 12542.26 12144.18 
WCTA          
β -2.9201a -3.4000a -2.8521a -2.7048a -3.1075a -2.6474a -2.1300a -2.5091a -1.6840a 
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SE 0.3286 0.3533 0.3375 0.2987 0.3107 0.3000 0.3571 0.3645 0.3442 
AIC 1745.31 1701.38 1700.15 1751.42 1706.69 1705.59 12114.67 11805.99 11934.96 
WCS          
β -1.8870a -1.8229a -1.6438a -1.7958a -1.7241a -1.5782a -1.5530a -1.3580a -1.0540a 
SE 0.2770 0.2724 0.2729 0.2609 0.2501 0.2482 0.2890 0.2652 0.2595 
AIC 1638.45 1658.85 1613.76 1643.09 1664.47 1620.71 11665.17 11757.54 11502.82 
CAG          
β -0.2799c -0.5790a -1.2346a -0.2719b -0.5426a -1.1636a -0.0643 -0.2673c -0.7301a 
SE 0.1512 0.1731 0.2203 0.1390 0.1586 0.2026 0.1342 0.1440 0.1791 
AIC 1830.94 1775.43 1610.59 1838.31 1783.90 1616.51 12647.23 12316.50 11161.17 
SAG          
β -1.1656a -1.6190a -1.7849a -1.1151a -1.4808a -1.4904a -0.5766b -0.9741a -0.7436a 
SE 0.2665 0.2951 0.3119 0.2478 0.2693 0.2711 0.2661 0.2680 0.2664 
AIC 1719.37 1666.91 1556.88 1725.12 1675.49 1566.20 12345.43 11927.15 11210.35 
TTA          
β -20.974a -20.448a -48.177a -17.538a -17.843a -42.345a -17.620a -16.050a -45.040a 
SE 5.5795 5.5359 8.4749 4.8925 4.9486 7.4022 5.6440 5.4830 9.1990 
AIC 1890.55 1877.57 1799.09 1898.95 1886.24 1808.33 12943.40 12792.58 12340.86 
STDEBV          
β -1.7364a -0.0330 0.5541a -1.5598a -0.0460 0.5348a -0.8312a 0.0242 0.4216b 
SE 0.3239 0.1968 0.1824 0.3018 0.1769 0.1596 0.2529 0.1814 0.1770 
AIC 1901.23 1897.58 1846.94 1908.93 1905.26 1854.31 12948.38 12805.56 12503.92 
EBITDAIE          
β -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0009b -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0008b -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0009b 
SE 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 
AIC 1827.81 1851.02 1791.41 1833.82 1858.40 1799.65 12565.97 12561.62 12210.71 
RETA          
β -0.4576a -0.3484a -0.2025a -0.4209a -0.3201a -0.1846a -0.2789a -0.1585a 0.0303 
SE 0.0511 0.0484 0.0493 0.0453 0.0431 0.0441 0.0598 0.0596 0.0627 
AIC 1788.77 1813.79 1811.38 1793.14 1819.79 1820.26 12422.61 12528.49 12529.59 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table reports univariate regression 
estimates of Event 1, Event 2 and Event 3 using respective hazard models and lagged time periods. Section A 
reports regression estimates of Event 1, Section B reports Event 2 and Section C reports Event 3. 
 
 
Table 9: Multivariate Regression  
Section A: Event 1 
Variable 
logit clog-log Cox 
T – 1 T – 2 T – 3 T – 1 T – 2 T – 3 T – 1 T – 2 T – 3 
STDEBV          
β  0.3008b   0.2010c   0.3709a  
SE  0.1295   0.1201   0.0884  
p-value  0.0200   0.0940   0.0000  
TLTA          
β 0.9948a   0.8597a   0.7369a   
SE 0.2226   0.1913   0.1384   
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p-value 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
CETL          
β -0.2530a   -0.2388a   -0.2259a   
SE 0.0700   0.0618   0.0448   
p-value 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
CTA          
β -0.3425  -2.2829a -0.2665  -1.9289a -0.2804  -1.7416a 
SE 0.4572  0.4935 0.3970  0.4305 0.2786  0.2893 
p-value 0.2440  0.0000 0.2320  0.0000 0.2100  0.0000 
FETA          
β 7.3617a 12.369a 6.1982b 6.0372a 11.740a 6.4750a 3.0878a 9.1737a 5.5547a 
SE 2.7061 2.3270 2.5504 2.3321 2.2416 2.2326 1.8124 1.6206 1.5421 
p-value 0.0070 0.0000 0.0150 0.0100 0.0000 0.0040 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 
FES          
β          
SE          
p-value          
EBITDAIE          
β  -0.0005b -0.0006a  -0.0005b -0.0006a  -0.0003b -0.0005a 
SE  0.0002 0.0002  0.0002 0.0002  0.0001 0.0001 
p-value  0.0200 0.0090  0.0120 0.0090  0.0420 0.0019 
EBITDATA          
β          
SE          
p-value          
OPCE          
β -0.5270a -0.2243  -0.4234a -0.2546  -0.2847b -0.1002  
SE 0.1812 0.1809  0.1550 0.1697  0.1185 0.1277  
p-value 0.0040 0.2150  0.0060 0.1340  0.0160 0.2300  
NIS          
β          
SE          
p-value          
RETA          
β          
SE          
p-value          
          
WCTA  -0.5958b   -0.6578a   -0.5090a  
β  0.2543   0.2462   0.1748  
SE  0.0190   0.0080   0.0036  
p-value          
WCS          
β          
SE          
p-value          
CAG          
β -0.2328c -0.1335  -0.2025c -0.1082  -0.3474a -0.2175b  
SE 0.1206 0.1120  0.1063 0.1039  0.0913 0.0862  
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p-value 0.0540 0.2330  0.0570 0.2480  0.0000 0.0120  
SAG          
β -0.5326a -0.2226 -0.2023 -0.4826a -0.1808 -0.2368c -0.8411a -0.4764a -0.2778b 
-SE 0.1748 0.1528 0.1643 0.1551 0.1438 0.1415 0.1351 0.1200 0.1155 
p-value 0.0020 0.1450 0.2180 0.0020 0.2090 0.0940 0.0000 0.0000 0.0160 
TTA          
β -4.1461 -10.394a -10.428a -3.4981 -9.5294a -8.9473a -1.1812 -7.6240a -7.0481a 
SE 3.5669 3.6154 3.5802 3.1214 3.3587 3.0952 2.4601 2.5793 2.3600 
p-value 0.2450 0.0040 0.0040 0.2420 0.0050 0.0040 0.6300 0.0031 0.0000 
Micro          
β 2.0176a 1.9982a 2.5646a 1.7140a 2.0089a 2.2413a 0.7910a 1.1579a 1.5554a 
SE 0.2419 0.2119 0.2412 0.2078 0.2038 0.2116 0.1295 0.1254 0.1257 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Small          
β 0.7552a 0.8696a 1.2075a 0.6548a 0.8792a 1.0438a 0.1142 0.3240a 0.5422a 
SE 0.2064 0.1899 0.2060 0.1829 0.1802 0.1861 0.1266 0.1225 0.1275 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3700 0.0084 0.0000 
AGE          
 0.4964a 0.5408a 0.7246a 0.3949a 0.5447a 0.6130a -33.253a -36.575a -43.231a 
β 0.1452 0.1451 0.1835 0.1266 0.1435 0.1631 1.0312 1.2182 1.2320 
SE 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
p-value          
RISK1 90.495a 77.879a 91.854a 77.607a 78.677a 78.7463a 46.871a 44.689a 43.998a 
β 7.3345 6.1372 7.3431 6.2999 6.1021 6.4905 3.0780 2.9346 3.3759 
SE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
p-value          
Model’s  Goodness  of  Fit  and  Performance  Measure 
Chi2 403.06a 321.8a 311.8a 411.2a 377.8a 311.9a 2785a 2874a 3222a 
 likelihood -1746.9 -1837.2 -1791.8 -1748.6 -1838.5 -1790.4 -3051.2 -3291.5 -3283.1 
AIC 3521.9 3702.3 3605.6 3525.3 3705.1 3602.9 6294.5 6753.4 7237.08 
N 46927 44400 40882 46927 44400 40882 46927 44400 40882 
Event 433 464 469 433 464 469 433 464 469 
AUROC-W 0.8209 0.7936 0.7827 0.8212 0.7929 0.7831 0.8192 0.7912 0.7797 
AUROC-H 0.7943 0.8339 0.9242 0.7890 0.8937 0.9233 0.7572 0.8784 0.9112 
Section B: Event 2 
STDEBV          
β 0.1743a 0.2511a 0.2533a 0.1544a 0.2151a 0.1998a 0.2003a 0.2046a 0.1974a 
SE 0.0388 0.0453 0.0456 0.0290 0.0328 0.0348 0.0233 0.0249 0.0290 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TLTA          
β 1.9886a 2.2478a 0.3296a 1.4622a 1.5668a 0.2143a 1.1641a 1.1266a 0.4912a 
SE 0.0654 0.0777 0.0723 0.0481 0.0548 0.0549 0.0347 0.0370 0.0418 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CETL          
β          
SE          
p-value          
CTA          
β  -1.3447a   -0.9909a   -0.5477a  
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SE  0.1462   0.1082   0.0769  
p-value  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
FETA          
β 15.786a 2.6571a 3.3366a 11.798a 2.1859a 2.6998a 8.6179a 3.6960a 4.5587a 
SE 0.7083 0.9955 0.9549 0.5354 0.7093 0.7338 0.4185 0.5306 0.6053 
p-value 0.0000 0.0080 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FES          
β  0.3141 0.8577a  0.0920 0.5806a  -0.3210b 0.1233 
SE  0.2911 0.2675  0.2110 0.2061  0.1461 0.1607 
p-value  0.2410 0.0010  0.6630 0.0050  0.0280 0.4400 
EBITDAIE          
β -0.0003a -0.0004a -0.0006a -0.0004a -0.0004a -0.0006a -0.0005a -0.0004a -0.0006a 
SE 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
p-value 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
EBITDATA          
β -0.1624a -0.7619a -0.3114a -0.0850a -0.5110a -0.2281a -0.0860a -0.3205a -0.1783a 
SE 0.0380 0.0467 0.0422 0.0264 0.0312 0.0312 0.0177 0.0205 0.0236 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
OPCE          
β -0.9026a -1.4723a -0.8999a -0.6398a -1.0036a -0.6650a -0.5802a -0.7744a -0.6558a 
SE 0.0471 0.0580 0.0538 0.0336 0.0395 0.0409 0.0260 0.0289 0.0341 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
NIS          
β          
SE          
p-value          
RETA          
β          
SE          
p-value          
WCTA          
β -0.5875a -0.2946a -0.1058 -0.5189a -0.3310a -0.1064 -0.3858a -0.2745a -0.0722 
SE 0.0881 0.1130 0.0948 0.0668 0.0832 0.0733 0.0501 0.0595 0.0566 
p-value 0.0000 0.0090 0.2440 0.0000 0.0000 0.1470 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000 
WCS          
β          
SE          
p-value          
CAG          
β  -0.7094a -0.1534a  -0.4575a -0.1116a  -0.4140a -0.1096a 
SE  0.0373 0.0300  0.0278 0.0240  0.0239 0.0221 
p-value  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
SAG          
β -0.0569 -0.3881a  -0.0652b -0.2993a  -0.1152a -0.2601a  
SE 0.0395 0.0461  0.0300 0.0342  0.0252 0.0284  
p-value 0.1500 0.0000  0.0300 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  
TTA          
β -11.374a -28.651a -14.413a -10.596a -25.191a -13.489a -11.846a -24.508a -14.586a 
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SE 1.0783 1.5922 1.1580 0.9030 1.3307 1.0279 0.7909 1.0302 0.9033 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Micro          
β 0.4154a 0.5147a 1.0577a 0.2928a 0.3762a 0.8451a 0.1853a 0.2582a 0.6144a 
SE 0.0662 0.0742 0.0683 0.0504 0.0556 0.0536 0.0342 0.0366 0.0377 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Small          
β 0.2786a 0.3265a 0.6749a 0.2094a 0.2675a 0.5466a 0.1471a 0.1845a 0.4122a 
SE 0.0488 0.0551 0.0521 0.0381 0.0423 0.0421 0.0279 0.0301 0.0316 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AGE          
β -0.0285 -0.1323a -0.0029 -0.0732a -0.1535a -0.0137 -24.865a -27.661a -33.798a 
SE 0.0353 0.0445 0.0453 0.0277 0.0343 0.0366 0.2734 0.3437 0.4217 
p-value 0.4190 0.0030 0.9490 0.0080 0.0000 0.7090 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
RISK2          
β 5.4673a 4.0201a 6.5065a 4.1230a 3.2239a 5.2226a 2.4035a 1.7983a 3.3036a 
SE 0.4117 0.4662 0.4423 0.3152 0.3513 0.3475 0.2266 0.2531 0.2688 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Model’s  Goodness  of  Fit  and  Performance  Measure 
Chi2 5135.9a 4381.9a 2228.2a 5818.2a 5039.8a 2307.3a 42073a 37046a 29048a 
 likelihood -13550.1 -10534.2 -12115.9 -13807.9 -10862.8 -12225.9 -52703.6 -42792.4 -39919.4 
AIC 27130.1 21104.3 24263.6 27645.9 21761.6 24483.8 105433.1 85616.7 79866.8 
N 44740 36907 33396 44740 36907 33396 44740 36907 33396 
Event 7553 6390 5721 7553 6390 5721 7553 6390 5721 
AUROC-W 0.8739 0.9015 0.7794 0.8721 0.8991 0.7767 0.8699 0.8969 0.7865 
AUROC-H 0.8436 0.8714 0.7783 0.8425 0.8686 0.7745 0.8414 0.8705 0.7803 
Section C: Event 3 
STDEBV          
β  0.4912c 0.6417b  0.4266c 0.4680c  0.6404a 0.6278a 
SE  0.2715 0.2861  0.2250 0.2401  0.1721 0.1593 
p-value  0.0700 0.0250  0.0580 0.0510  0.0000 0.0000 
TLTA          
β  1.7594a 1.5434a  1.6420a 1.3451a  1.4437a 1.0166a 
SE  0.4712 0.4767  0.3943 0.4140  0.2787 0.2551 
p-value  0.0000 0.0010  0.0000 0.0010  0.0000 0.0000 
CETL          
β -0.4543a   -0.4430a   -1.0176a   
SE 0.1747   0.1682   0.1237   
p-value 0.0090   0.0080   0.0000   
CTA          
β   -1.3311   -1.0743   -0.9048 
SE   1.1703   1.0090   0.6390 
p-value   0.2450   0.2870   0.1600 
FETA          
β 12.022a 16.656a 15.631a 9.5936a 13.686a 14.313a 5.7686b 10.272a 7.3060b 
SE 4.1089 4.9550 5.7427 3.5011 4.1907 4.9884 2.8568 3.3580 3.5285 
p-value 0.0030 0.0010 0.0060 0.0060 0.0010 0.0040 0.0440 0.0000 0.0380 
FES          
β          
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SE          
p-value          
EBITDAIE          
β          
SE          
p-value          
EBITDATA          
β          
SE          
p-value          
OPCE          
β  -0.4816 -0.3651  -0.4501 -0.2209  -0.5053b -0.3928c 
SE  0.3382 0.3815  0.2829 0.3328  0.2123 0.2202 
p-value  0.1540 0.2390  0.1120 0.5070  0.0170 0.0750 
NIS          
β          
SE          
p-value          
RETA          
β -0.2000a   -0.1957a   0.0104   
SE 0.0751   0.0659   0.0451   
p-value 0.0080   0.0030   0.8199   
WCTA          
β -0.6195 -0.8440  -0.5472 -0.5571  0.0368 -0.4660  
SE 0.5165 0.6515  0.4475 0.5384  0.3657 0.4109  
p-value 0.2300 0.1950  0.2210 0.3010  0.9200 0.2600  
WCS          
β   -0.4132   -0.3643   -0.2302 
SE   0.4486   0.3830   0.2504 
p-value   0.2470   0.3410   0.3600 
CAG          
β   -0.5432b   -0.4291c   -0.4133b 
SE   0.2587   0.2286   0.1692 
p-value   0.0360   0.0610   0.0150 
SAG          
β -0.2695 -0.7311b -0.8411b -0.1909 -0.6557b -0.7206b -0.7072a -1.0009a -0.6980a 
SE 0.2873 0.3311 0.3575 0.2571 0.2863 0.3126 0.2307 0.2441 0.2369 
p-value 0.2480 0.0270 0.0190 0.4580 0.0220 0.0210 0.0022 0.0004 0.0032 
TTA          
β -15.152c -3.948 -36.756a -14.043c -3.288 -30.773a -12.173b -3.463 -21.901a 
SE 8.458 8.164 11.596 7.407 6.970 10.121 5.458 5.151 7.195 
p-value 0.0730 0.6290 0.0020 0.0580 0.6370 0.0020 0.0260 0.5000 0.0023 
Micro          
β 1.9486a 2.4476a 2.7400a 1.6619a 1.9905a 2.2511a 1.3615a 1.3692a 1.5166a 
SE 0.4272 0.4541 0.4979 0.3718 0.3700 0.4144 0.2614 0.2485 0.2334 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Small          
β 0.4747 0.4216 0.6411 0.3976 0.3934 0.5285 0.4086c 0.2318 0.2639 
SE 0.3809 0.4366 0.4742 0.3376 0.3681 0.4114 0.2418 0.2565 0.2572 
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p-value 0.2130 0.2340 0.1760 0.2390 0.2850 0.1990 0.0910 0.3700 0.3000 
AGE          
β 0.9837a 0.7653b 0.4242 0.8869a 0.6001b 0.3010 -42.888a -47.477a -35.227a 
SE 0.2714 0.3363 0.3910 0.2386 0.2799 0.3439 2.4175 2.0754 3.2681 
p-value 0.0000 0.0230 0.2480 0.0000 0.0320 0.3810 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
RISK3          
β 219.806a 226.564a 239.428a 204.698a 189.601a 211.302a 94.989a 87.859a 79.818a 
SE 22.477 24.405 29.131 16.901 17.913 21.444 11.357 11.824 10.728 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Model’s  Goodness  of  Fit  and  Performance  Measure 
Chi2 170.1a 155.2a 132.6a 236.5a 202.6a 167.3a 1149a 1112a 1084a 
 likelihood -657.02 -590.5 -529.3 -660.6 -592.1 -530.7 -938.6 -881.6 -808.5 
AIC 1338.1 1207.1 1088.6 1345.2 1210.3 1091.4 2117.9 2048.1 1808.8 
Censored 50126 40639 35327 50126 40639 35327 50126 40639 35327 
Event 143 136 131 143 136 131 143 136 131 
AUROC-W 0.8840 0.9019 0.9020 0.8840 0.9031 0.9015 0.8783 0.8955 0.8964 
AUROC-H 0.9249 0.8924 0.9668 0.9317 0.9019 0.9214 0.9447 0.8653 0.9556 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table reports multivariate 
regression estimates of Event 1, Event 2 and Event 3 using respective hazard models and lagged time periods. 
Section A reports regression estimates of Event 1, Section B reports Event 2 and Section C reports Event 3. The 
Chi2 values reported for logit and cloglog estimates is obtained using Wald test, while for Cox regression it is 
obtained using likelihood ratio test. AUROC-W represents within sample and AUROC-H represents hold-out 
sample  area  under  ROC  curves.  ‘Event’  reports  total  number  of  observations  with  dependent  variable  =  1  and  
‘censored’  reports  total  number  of  observations  with  dependent  variable  =  0.     
  
 
 
Figure 1: Table of Hazard Curves 
 
Notes: This table reports smoothed hazard curves estimated using the development sample for different definitions of 
financial  distress  events  as  discussed  in  section  2.  Here  ‘Age’  represents  the  age  of  firms  in  years. 
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Figure 2: Table of Area under ROC curves 
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